

THE SLAVE TRADE,

THE AFRICAN SQUADRON,

AND

MR. HUTT'S COMMITTEE.

By THE HON. CAPTAIN DENMAN, R. N.

[REPRINTED FROM THE "COLONIAL MAGAZINE."]

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY JOHN MORTIMER,
15, BEAUFORT BUILDINGS, STRAND.

Price One Shilling

✓

Selkman
18506
D23

THE SLAVE TRADE,
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON,
AND
MR. HUTT'S COMMITTEE.

- Report of the Lords' Committee on Slave Trade.* 1849.
The Niger Trade Considered in connexion with the African Blockade. By Sir George Stephen. Simpkin and Marshall.
Two Reports of the Slave Trade Committee of the House of Commons. 1848 and 1849.
Lord Denman's two Letters to Lord Brougham. Hatchard.
A Few Words on the Encouragement given to Slave Trade and Slavery, &c. By Stephen Cave, Esq. Murray.
The Case of our African Cruizers, &c. By the Rev. G. Smith. Hatchard and Son.
West Indian Interests, African Emigration and Slave Trade. By the Hon. Captain Denman. Bigg and Son.
The African Squadron. By Capt. Matson, R.N. Fourth edition. Ridgway.
Free Trade in Negroes. Ollivier.
The Cruizers; a Letter to the Marquis of Lansdowne, &c. By James Richardson.
Letter from Sir George Stephen to Sir E. F. Buxton on the Proposed Revival of the English Slave Trade. Simpkin and Marshall.
Analysis of Evidence before the Committees on the Slave Trade. "Patriot" Newspaper.

ACCORDING to the promise in our August Number, we have devoted much attention to the question of the suppression of the slave trade, and the squadron on the coast of Africa—an inquiry of great difficulty, not only from the magnitude and importance

of the subject, but also from the studious care which has been taken to keep the facts and arguments urged in their behalf entirely out of the public view. The greater part of the pamphlets at the head of this article are totally unknown to the public in general, and yet, to any candid investigation, their consideration would be absolutely essential. The resolutions of the committee of the House of Lords have been also kept entirely out of sight, while those of the House of Commons have been reported and urged on the public attention, as bearing a character the very reverse of that which truly belongs to them. Who takes the trouble to wade through the blue-books, or even to notice the numbers on each side in the divisions on each resolution? For one who gives himself the pains to reckon even the latter with his own eyes, ten thousand take the leading article of the *Times* as if it were Gospel truth. Thus it is not the report of Mr. Hutt's committee which has so powerfully aided Mr. Hutt's own views, but it is the *Times'* account of that report; and as regards its true weight and value, as bearing on the question, two things could scarcely be more different, or even opposite.

For a long period, the *Times* has devoted itself to the bitterest hostility against the various measures of justice towards the negro, which have done honour to this country. The great and holy principles of *right* which dictated these measures have been utterly put out of sight, and we have had, instead, perpetual attempts to create envy of the condition of the emancipated negroes, by comparing it with that of our own working classes, and a constant strain of taunting ridicule at the folly which threw away the profits of slavery and the slave trade.

Our connexion with the colonies led us to observe, with the deepest interest, the course pursued by the *Times* on the Sugar Duties Bill of 1846. We have read, over and over again, its laboured statements of the cruel condition of the West Indian colonies, first deprived of slave labour by the ruthless stupidity of the Buxtons, the Clarksons, and the Wilberforces, (which would appear to be the act most hateful to the *Times*), and then cut off by the more congenial economists from the protection assured to them when their slaves were enfranchised, and without which, it was as well known then as now, they could not compete with slave-trading and slave growing countries. This dilemma has been repeated month after month, and year after year, in the columns of the *Times*; but we have looked in vain, amidst all its assurances of pity, for one single practical suggestion for the benefit of the sufferers.

For a short time, indeed, the *Times* encouraged the delusion that unlimited African Emigration was the remedy ; but this nostrum, already proved by Lord Sandon's committee of 1842 to be out of the question, received its *coup-de-grace* from Lord George Bentinck's committee in its report in 1848. That committee's opinion, that a 10s. protection could alone save the West Indies, received no support from the *Times*, which still continued harping on West Indian depression and African slave trade, in a succession of articles as unworthy of the "leading journal of Europe" in talent as in morality, and placing the British people, whose sentiments it professes to speak, in a most unenviable light before the civilised world.

At length, deprived, as the *Times* has so often told us, first of slavery, and then of protection, the colonies became awakened to the truth, viz., that their continued cultivation depends on the suppression of the slave trade. Put down the slave trade, they say, and we may yet prosper. Slavery we can compete with, but not with slavery perpetually recruited by fresh importations, where the slaves are forced, by the most appalling cruelties, to yield the largest possible amount of labour in the shortest possible time, and are maintained on the principle that it is "cheaper to import than to breed." This crime, say the colonists, has been*denounced by the civilised world in congress—it is condemned by the laws of every state. Two states alone still give it a surreptitious sanction, though it is condemned even by their own municipal codes, and though they are both pledged to England, by the most solemn engagements, to put the traffic down. These are the rivals whose competition is destroying the colonies, and it is the stimulus of slave trade alone that gives them such an overwhelming advantage. Accordingly, public meetings assembled in the West Indies, unequalled in the number and respectability of the attendance, in the moderation and propriety of their language, in their singleness and honesty of purpose, and, we may safely add, in the reason and justice of their demand. The slaves had been enfranchised, the pledge of continued protection broken, but the pledge to suppress the slave trade remained, measures for the purpose were in operation, though with imperfect success. The perishing colonies stretch forth their hands, and implore the mother country to act with increased vigour. The slave trade, they say, will complete our ruin ; every slave voyage is a breach of treaty ; this monstrous pursuit at an end, and we can yet raise our heads and prosper ; leave it to itself, and we are lost. We implore you, then, as a duty of justice and mercy towards us—whose wrongs you

acknowledge—to enforce your compacts, and to suppress this horrid traffic.

We waited with anxiety for the notice the *Times* would give to this touching and powerful appeal. We find the following words:—

“Concurrently with the exercise of these tactics, another scheme of agitation was recently introduced. It was resolved, at large public meetings, to demand of Great Britain the performance of her compacts relative to the slave trade. It is unnecessary to state that the real purport of these resolutions was not enunciated in their expressed terms. The spirit in which they were carried was less that of philanthropy than *faction*; but it would be vain to deny that they were plausibly couched, and not unsoundly based. Our obligation to suppress slavery with the strong hand was the complement of our abrupt dealings with our colonies. Could we really have fulfilled it, the West Indians would have been placed once more on a fair footing with their commercial rivals. . . . None know better than the inhabitants of Jamaica that this failure was inevitable, and that the most desperate efforts have not been wanting on our part to order matters otherwise; but they choose to forget this fact, and to avail themselves of the letter of the compact to embarrass or convict. Nor are they without warrant for such proceeding. They can, undoubtedly, demand at our hands the fulfilment of terms, to enforce which would cost us in one year all that slave-grown sugar could save us in ten.”—*Times*, Aug. 10.

Yes, this is the reply of the sympathising *Times*, after all its friendly assurances: having pronounced *ex cathedra* against the squadron, on grounds so unsatisfactory that the meanest shifts must be resorted to to support the dictum, it now declares this touching and powerful appeal to be mere faction!

Small is the gratitude due to the “leading journal” on the part of the unhappy colonists. In their name, we ask, what are the remedies it would apply to the cruelty and injustice it has so perpetually denounced to the country? What is the nostrum it has so long slurked from prescribing? It has refused to support renewed protection. The suppression of the slave trade is a request so absurd that nothing but faction could urge it. Is it, then, restored slave trade? or is there some other resource? or, while we confess and deplore our injustice, are we to refuse all redress? It is due to the colonies—to the public at large—to its own high pretensions, that after years of mysterious thunderings, the Oracle should speak forth; or shall we still be left in silence and Cimmerian gloom, until the difficulty is past, and

the ruin of the colonies a *fait accompli*? In common with thousands of expectants, we await the answer, which can scarcely be longer postponed. There may be some difficulty, however, in finding terms which will not shock what the *Times* probably considers the yet remaining delusion of that infatuated stupidity which shut out Englishmen from the gains of slavery and slave trading.

While the *Times* has thus left its real objects hitherto undeclared, the *Daily News* has at length stood forward the avowed advocate of slave trade, to be prosecuted as a duty to God and man, by England and the world at large! Yes, England has hitherto "laboured against the providential course of events." She is then of course, to repair the wrong by a proportionate activity in slave trading.

In the *Daily News* of September 10, we are first told that, "it must be admitted to have been amongst the designs of Providence, that a large proportion of the labouring classes of the new world, and at least those destined to cultivate its equatorial regions, should be supplied from the African continent. There alone is to be found a race capable of braving the sun of such regions, and of undergoing the labours of agricultural industry beneath it. We have heard and seen irresistible tides of emigration, but never was tide more irresistible than that which bears the negro from a land where labour is valueless to a land where it is of all value." Then we are informed that "we have been labouring during the last half century both against the natural and the providential course of events, in striving to stop altogether the negro emigration to America." If we had not interfered, it seems that "we should be spared the odium and the expense of struggling against nature, as well as against our best political friends and commercial connexions, in obedience to a most noble, indeed, but a most mistaken, policy of humanity." And our present difficulties and future prospects are disposed of thus:—"The ruined planters of our West Indian possessions taunt us with our fickleness and their ruin. We, no doubt, have wherewithal to answer these reproaches; but it is a dire and a bootless recrimination. Besides, to open the trade in labour to Brazil and Cuba, and limit it to Jamaica and Demerara, is adding the wrong of present injustice to that of past ignorance. We hear of schemes for licensing the trade to Rio and to the Havana. But this forms but half the difficulty, but a portion of the question. We have the labour question in our own colonies to settle at the same time that we negotiate its arrangements with Spain and with Brazil. We have been guilty, in the name of humanity,

of very great ignorance and very gross injustice. If we resolve to make amends, let it be done on all hands evenly, honestly, and sincerely."

We thank the *Daily News* for thus bringing the matter to a point. We see now fairly brought to light what has been the object in view, after all, of those who have set this movement going. Hundreds of thousands of excellent persons have been deceived, and led to believe the squadron has done pure harm. They conscientiously demand its withdrawal, because they have been persuaded it aggravates suffering, and has no other effect on the slave trade. The public and a large portion of the press have in short been fooled to the top of their bent, by a small, but compact body, whose object from the first has been a restoration of an unlimited slave trade, and at last the cloven foot appears.

If we reflect on the subject, we shall see that there is no single class whose money interests would be immediately advanced if the slave trade were put an end to. Interest and prejudice combine powerfully on the other side. First, there is an inordinate anxiety for increased exports to Brazil. An open slave trade would soon double the profits of the mines in which so much English capital is invested. English capital is also known to be largely laid out directly in slave trading transactions, as has been repeatedly stated in Parliament and elsewhere, and never denied or even questioned. Wherever the interests of the moment appear all on one side, it is pretty certain that the arguments on the other will have scarcely fair play; but that the interests of individuals may be very different from that of the country at large, is singularly exemplified in the question we are considering, for in Brazil the present money interest of every class would insure a vast increase of slave trade if England withdrew her squadron, although it is on all hands acknowledged it would be highly detrimental, and probably entirely destructive, to that country in the long run. So also with respect to England, a calm and full inquiry proves that, however numerous classes might profit by the opposite course, the true interest of the country imperatively demands perseverance in that policy against which an hostility so bitter and unscrupulous has been excited; for it has been proved beyond all doubt, that an open slave trade would drive all other commerce from the shores of Africa, while its suppression, as has been already shown in several parts, will be followed by a steady growth of lawful trade. Can there be a comparison in their true value to this country, of Africa, a howling wilderness, and Brazil unnaturally developed, but only by

receiving into its vitals the elements of certain and speedy destruction; or of a temporary check to the productive power of Brazil, which would at the same time insure an ultimate and prolonged condition of health and prosperity, while Africa, once relieved from the curse of slave trade, would every hour advance in the scale of civilization, and soon take its place amongst the most valuable commercial countries.

To the adverse money interests of the moment must be added the scarcely less powerful impulses of prejudice; the Peace Society rules paramount in the councils of the self-styled champions of the Negro, the Anti-Slavery Society.

These visionaries declare that, even in the tropics—in the West Indies, as compared with Brazil, free labour will beat slave trade and slave labour—that free labour will effect, first, the suppression of the slave trade, and then the abolition of slavery itself. They also contend that all attempts to suppress the slave trade by the application of force are wrong and reprehensible, and moral influences alone are justifiable. In the mean time they see the West Indies perishing in the struggle, though the price of a Negro in Brazil has been quadrupled, and the number introduced in the same degree diminished by the efforts of the squadron; though the women, being as one to ten to the men, no possible means exist by which the slave population can be maintained except by continual importations; and while they know that the ruthless system of “the largest amount of labour in the shortest time” wrings eighteen hours’ work out of the twenty-four from its victims, and consumes annually five per cent. of the whole number, they still adhere obstinately to their theories, and have given the whole weight of their title to the cause of perpetual slave trade. Their title is indeed their only weight, but still all-powerful when perverted to betray the interests of the Negro, who has no means of making his protest heard. To these various parties, by a strange perversity, the free traders have allied themselves—free trade—which is to unite all mankind in peace and amity—which now joins the Peace Society, and then talks of “crumpling up” Russia—which now talks of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market as the first duty of mankind, and then would frighten and abuse the capitalists who lend money to Austria. These men will talk of the rights of mankind in Hungary and Italy, yet, such is the magic in the colour of a skin, would apply to the purchase and sale of Negroes the principles of free trade, under which they assure us every sort of commerce will increase, as surely as two added to two

makes four ! From this assertion they have never swerved, and, abhorrent as it may be to call this hateful crime commerce, there cannot be a doubt of the truth of the axiom as applied to it, if the experiment should unhappily be tried. The result of these various causes is to place the subject before the public with only one side displayed to view. On scarcely any other have the people of England deeper reason to feel interest, or a stronger claim for the fullest and fairest information, for on no other has public opinion been brought to bear more powerfully or with a more direct and general responsibility, in establishing a great national course of action. Public opinion, in spite of the utmost efforts of the powerful interests on the other side, has obliged successive governments to carry all the various measures bearing on slave trade or slavery. Public opinion enforced the regulation of the English Colonial Slave Trade in 1788, its final abolition in 1807, and again the Emancipation Bill in 1834. Public opinion urged on an unwilling government all the efforts against the traffic at the Congress of Vienna ; which, in declaring it a crime against humanity and universal morality, spoke the sentiments of the people of England. The same power has dictated all the subsequent negotiations with foreign states : it compelled an unwilling ministry to adopt the existing system more than thirty years ago, and has ever since perpetually urged increased vigour and perseverance. But while the public treasure has been scattered broadcast, the public will has never been supported by any concentration of purpose, any energy or systematic action upon the part of any single government. Above all, there has been a total absence of union between the several departments, on the joint efforts of which success necessarily depends ; and the result has been imperfect, though far less so than might have been expected from the manner in which the struggle has been conducted. The partial failure, exaggerated by interest and prejudice, has now been made to appear not only a total failure of effecting the slightest good, but as having in all respects aggravated every evil ; and on a subject on which public opinion must be all-powerful, and where the right to know the truth, and the duty of each man to examine for himself, is so obvious, the combination we have described opposes peculiar difficulties to the honest inquirer. We have been much struck with the unfairness with which the question has been stated to the public, and step by step as we have proceeded in our investigations, our convictions have become the more firmly enlisted on what now appears to be the unpopular side. But what has finally confirmed our opinions in

favour, not of the present system (for the evidence proves the astonishing absence of all system), but in favour of maintaining the African squadron, to be henceforward employed for clearly-defined objects, steadily and consistently, has been the reports of Mr. Hutt's committee.

It will be remembered that, early in the session of '48, Mr Hutt moved for this committee in a speech in which he declared that the squadron had aggravated the sufferings, while it had wholly failed to effect the slightest diminution of the slave trade, and in which he emphatically declared his own mind to be made up to withdraw the squadron, and abandon the attempt—in his own words, “to leave the slave trade to itself.” The majority of the committee, at the outset of the inquiry, were undoubtedly of Mr. Hutt's way of thinking; but the reports record a perpetual decrease of that majority, until the final report, in 1849, when Mr. Hutt's resolutions were adopted for consideration *by his own casting vote*, and when nearly every resolution, as proposed severally to the committee, was carried in the same manner. Such is the result, after a prolonged inquiry, conducted of course, most favourably to Mr. Hutt's own views, in the selection of witnesses, and in the general line of examination. The committee was appointed to consider “the best means of suppressing the African slave trade”—it was entirely directed to Mr. Hutt's object of “leaving it to itself”—it was confined to the object of condemning the means actually in operation, without even a pretence of inquiring whether those means could be made more effectual, or whether any others could be devised. The total silence on this subject shows that the committee despaired of finding any substitute, and that the alternative of the present system would be slave trade perpetual and unlimited. This being the result of such an inquiry, the utmost weight it should have with the public is, the proof it affords that Mr. Hutt remains of the same opinion, but has failed to convince his committee. And yet this report has been put forward by the opponents of the squadron as if it settled the question for ever; and the public are invited to believe that, instead of Mr. Hutt's solitary voice, we hear the decision of a triumphant majority.

“If we had any inclination to magnify our own triumphs, we should point with considerable satisfaction to the second report of the select committee on the slave trade which we yesterday published. Many months have elapsed since we commenced our strictures upon the existing system of prevention, during which interval an inquiry, instituted with all the fairness,

and conducted with all the intelligence which the subject demanded, has been incessantly directed to the elucidation of those practical truths which should govern the policy of a practical people." After mentioning the concluding sentences of the report, condemnatory of attempts to repress the slave trade by force, the writer proceeds—"That these, and no other conclusions were, in point of fact, absolutely imperative upon those who had to decide upon the evidence before them, is what we conceive no person, except a certain noble antagonist of ours, would venture, after a careful perusal of the report in question, to gainsay or deny."—*Times*, July 7.

No hint is here given of a divided committee—no possible suspicion would arise of the true state of the case. We ask, is this honest, or is it likely that a cause, good in itself, and able to bear the light, would be supported by such advocacy?

In the discussion of a topic of immediate home interest, it would be superfluous to animadvert upon the ephemeral misrepresentations of the *Times*, or other newspapers. On such occasions the thunder of the press may indeed astonish the minds of the multitude; but all the attention and intelligence of society is instantly enlisted on the other side, mis-statements are exposed, and false reasonings detected, and the community is protected from any practically mischievous results. We may cite, as an instance, the hopeless war long waged by the leading journal against the New Poor-Law. The constant reader may have been melted by the eloquent appeals addressed to him day after day, but the rate-payer reflected, and was obdurate.

It is hardly necessary to observe that the present question is of a different class. It is apparently extraneous to the ordinary duties and occupations of the life of most men. Its patient investigation is, therefore, declined, as involving an unnecessary outlay of mental labour, and if the public business of the country requires that some resolution should be taken, the generality of men gratefully adopt the course of action suggested by any one who will relieve them from the trouble of reflecting and deciding. Should, moreover, the conclusion so attained be made to tally in appearance with any current theory, there is an additional inducement to adopt it, as a step in the right direction, without much forethought as to the ulterior result, or any inquiry as to the motives, of the adviser. At present it is the fashion to take a narrow mercantile view of questions involving the most important principles of politics, and even morals. Our generation is taught to complain that our fathers bequeathed us liberty and empire, burdened with a heavy mortgage, and that, in behalf of

the parsimony thus rendered indispensable in our impoverished condition, everything hitherto thought requisite to the power and character of a great nation should be sacrificed without regret, and without delay. The fatalist theory, too, of a certain section of political economists, contributes to reconcile the country to the dereliction of its duties, and the surrender of its inheritance. It is expensive, it may be dangerous, to retain colonies, says the mercantile politician; it is the necessary course of things, says the theorist, that the colonies should part company with the mother country. A precisely analogous line of argument is taken with respect to the slave trade. Political philosophy offers to relieve us from an uneasy sensation of shame when we descend to parley with pusillanimity and avarice. To that portion of the public mind which has become mean and enervated under such instruction, nothing could be more acceptable than for the *Times* to insinuate that the report of Mr. Hutt's committee resulted from the deliberate and unanimous conviction of fifteen intelligent and impartial inquirers.

Facts, however, cannot be talked away. The Blue Book before us attests that, on the question, whether Mr. Hutt's draft should be taken as the basis of their report, the committee divided, seven against seven; and then, on every one of his several resolutions against the squadron there was again an equal division—so that Mr. Hutt's opinions were carried by Mr. Hutt's vote.

The resolutions which show a larger majority were all, more or less, deprecatory of Mr. Hutt's views. Thus the fourth resolution proposed by the Chairman,—“Your Committee are, therefore, constrained to believe that no modification of the system now in force can effect the suppression of the slave trade, and they cannot undertake the responsibility of recommending the continuance of that system,”—was carried by his own casting vote; while Mr. Denison's amendment, added thereto, deprecating the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the squadron was carried without opposition: so also was Mr. Hutt's resolution about avowing unabated hostility to slave trade; and the last resolution, urging the duty of encouraging commerce and missionary labour, for the purpose of civilising and improving Africa, was carried by eleven to three. These form the only exceptions to the general rule that in the final report, the majority consisted of Mr. Hutt *solus*.

We earnestly entreat attention to the reports of this committee, and to the evidence on which they are professedly founded, for these will convince the most prejudiced that the

minority who so gallantly fought the battle in the committee had the *right* on their side, and that slight as must be the weight of reports thus carried, their intrinsic value is, if possible, even less worthy of influencing the judgment of parliament, or of the public.

The main grounds Mr. Hutt and those who think with him have striven to establish, and on which they demand that the squadron shall be recalled, and the slave trade henceforth left to itself are—first, that the squadron has produced an immense increase of suffering and mortality; secondly, That it has wholly failed, and must fail, to diminish the amount of the traffic.

In support of these propositions, the first resolution laid before the house at the close of the session of 1848, embodies a formal, elaborate, tabular statement, purporting to be an authentic history of the statistics of the slave trade from 1788 down to the year 1848. The third column professes to show the mortality on the passage across the Atlantic, for each year, on the whole number embarked from Africa; and from 1788 to 1815 this mortality is stated to amount to 14 per cent.

But in the year 1815 the first treaty for the suppression of the foreign slave trade, by means of a British force, was signed, and then the tables inform us the mortality instantly increased to 25 per cent.—a truly marvellous effect of putting pen to paper, *for no steps were taken to enforce this treaty for upwards of two years.* But let that pass. Parliament is informed by its committee that from the moment England interfered, 25 per cent. perished on the voyage, instead of 14 per cent., and these tables pretend thus to establish that the squadron has caused a vast increase of horrors.

These statistics form the very groundwork of the reports of the committee; they were presented to Parliament as the result of its inquiry in 1848, and when the committee met to agree to its final report, its first step was to approve and confirm the resolutions of the previous session by a majority of 8 to 5.

We give these tables *in extenso*, because without their assistance it will be almost impossible to convince the public of their real value, coming, as they do, in a form claiming the peculiar character of official authenticity. We are especially anxious that they should speak for themselves, as it is upon them that the conclusions of the committee adverse to the squadron are based.

Foreign Office Reports, and Bandinel's Abstract.

No. 1.—MEMORANDA of the Number of SLAVES computed to have been Exported and Imported Westward from Africa, from 1788 to 1840.

DATE.	Amount of Slaves Exported.	Average casualties during the Voyage.		Slaves Imported into Spanish Colonies.	Imported into Portuguese Colonies.	Imported into other Countries.	Total Amount of Slaves Imported.	Loss by Casualties (again stated).	TOTAL (as at first).
		Average Proportion.	Amount.						
In 1788 - - -	100,000	14 per cent.	14,000	25,000	18,000	44,000	86,000	14,000	100,000
1798 to 1805	85,000	14 "	12,000	15,000	20,000	38,000	73,000	12,000	85,000
1805 to 1810	85,000	14 "	12,000	15,000	25,000	33,000	73,000	12,000	85,000
1810 to 1815	93,000	14 "	13,000	30,000	30,000	20,000	80,000	13,000	93,000
1815 to 1817	106,600	25 "	26,600	32,000	31,000	17,000	80,000	26,600	106,600
1817 to 1819	106,600	25 "	26,600	34,000	34,000	12,000	80,000	26,600	106,600
Captured by Cruisers:									
1819 to 1825	103,000	25 "	25,800	39,000	37,000	1,200	77,200	25,800	103,000
1825 to 1830	125,000	25 "	31,000	40,000	50,000	4,000	94,000	31,000	125,000
1830 to 1835	78,500	25 "	19,600	40,000	15,000	3,900	58,900	19,600	78,500
1835 to 1840	135,800	25 "	33,900	29,000	65,000	7,900	101,900	33,900	135,800

No. 2.—MEMORANDA of the Number of SLAVES computed to have been annually Exported and Imported Westward from Africa, from 1840—48.

DATE.	Amount of Slaves Exported.	Average casualties during the Voyage.		Slaves Imported into Spanish Colonies.	Imported into Brazil.	Captured by Cruisers.	Total Amount of Slaves Imported.	Loss by Casualties (again stated).	TOTAL. (as at first).
		Average Proportion.	Amount.						
1840 - - -	64,114	25 per cent.	16,068	14,470	30,000	3,616	48,086	16,028	64,114
1841 - - -	45,097	25 "	11,274	11,837	16,000	5,966	33,823	11,274	45,097
1842 - - -	28,400	25 "	7,100	3,150	14,200	3,950	21,300	7,100	28,400
1843 - - -	55,062	25 "	13,765	8,000	30,500	2,797	41,297	13,765	55,062
1844 - - -	54,102	25 "	13,525	10,000	26,000	4,577	40,577	13,525	54,102
1845 - - -	36,758	25 "	9,189	1,350	22,700	3,519	27,569	9,189	36,758
1846 - - -	76,117	25 "	19,029	1,700	52,600	2,788	57,088	19,029	76,117
1847 - - -	84,356	25 "	21,089	1,500	57,800	3,967	63,267	21,089	84,356

But what if these authentic tables prove to be altogether unsupported? What if the evidence taken before this very committee should prove them to be wholly untrue, and opposite to the truth? Startling as the assertion may appear, we pledge ourselves to make it good.

Nothing can be more perfectly established than that the mortality of the voyage during the regulated slave trade of England was 14 per cent. That trade was abolished in 1807, and the traffic, in general, was left to itself until 1815; during this period the committee's table gives a mortality still of 14 per cent. But, as we said before, with the first treaty the mortality of the slaves exported from Africa, whether to Cuba or to Brazil, is stated to have instantly sprung up to 25 per cent., and this average is gravely applied to each year, from 1815 down to 1848.

For fifteen years from the commencement of the struggle the efforts of England consisted in sending five or six most unsuitable vessels to the coast of Africa, "to cruize for the suppression of the slave trade," and until the year 1824 the vessels were removed from the coast during the rainy season, several months of each year, when the ship-sloops, and gun-brigs went to some distant port, while the commodore returned to England, reporting an enormous and undiminished slave trade.

For the whole of this time all the treaties restricted the power of seizure to cases of vessels met with after their slaves were shipped, and every vessel, though obviously and avowedly a slaver, was perfectly safe until this final act was committed. Applying, then, to the tables for the alleged effect of these five vessels, armed with such powers against a commerce so enormous, it is on the very face of it absurd to attribute to them any such result; but if we extend our inquiry, we shall see that, as regards one-half of the slave trade (and this estimate is applied to the whole), such an effect was simply impossible, inasmuch as the slave trade of Brazil, was by express treaty, entirely protected from all question or interference from British cruizers; for not only were the powers above described limited by the treaty with Portugal to north latitude; but by distinct stipulations the unmolested continuance of the Brazilian slave trade, and the perfect freedom of Portuguese slave ships under every possible circumstance, south of the line, were guaranteed by provisions as distinct, stringent, and complete as those for the suppression of the traffic in north latitude were feeble and insufficient. No slave could be legally imported into Brazil except from the African colonies of Portugal, which all lay in south latitude; the great bulk of the Brazil slave trade was, therefore, absolutely

untouched, and incapable of being touched, by the British squadron. Not a cruiser was ever stationed south of the equator, and if occasionally Portuguese slave vessels came to the Bight of Benin for their cargoes, in order to evade the duties levied on slaves exported from the colonies of Portugal, this voluntary exposure to the risk of capture, which would arise as soon as slaves were thus shipped north of the equator, strikingly proves how trifling that risk was, and how utterly incapable such a force, acting under these restrictions, must have been to produce any effect whatever, *even on that part of the slave trade which it was nominally permitted to assail*. These facts are taken from the evidence printed by the committee, and if this were all, it would be enough to deprive its conclusions of all value; but what follows is yet more crushing.

In 1839 the squadron obtained the power to seize the equipped slave vessels of every slave-trading nation; and then, also, the protection of the Portuguese treaty, which had hitherto covered the slave trade of Brazil, was swept away, and, for the first time it became possible for British cruisers to assail the traffic south of the equator. It then (however untrue) ceased to be utterly absurd to suppose that the squadron might increase the ratio of mortality in the voyage across the ocean, and indeed as applied to the period *subsequent to 1839*, some evidence (though it was highly unsatisfactory and suspicious) was certainly given, accounting in some degree for the tables presented to Parliament by the committee in 1848. In April, 1849, however, the committee summoned before it Sir Charles Hotham, who had just returned from the command on the coast of Africa, and whose evidence has been cited as strongly supporting Mr. Hutt's opinions, though a careful consideration of his whole evidence will produce a very different conclusion. On this question of the increased mortality caused by the squadron, his statement is worthy of being extracted at length. He says, in answer to question 676, "I have proved that the mortality under the worst measures, which I consider are while the slaves are under our control, only amounts to nine per cent." "With Dr. Cliffe's evidence I have no concern; with respect to the evidence of the other officers, I trust they will pardon me, if I say they have no grounds for arriving at any thing approaching to a correct calculation. Only the commander-in-chief of a large squadron is competent to form a fair opinion, and he does that from returns from the Admiralty Court, checked again by returns from officers in charge of cruisers." Sir Charles Hotham then gives in an authentic return, which proves that of near 14,000 slaves captured during the two years and a-half of his command, *the mortality up to the*

date of adjudication was nine per cent.; and he estimates the mortality in those vessels that escape at five per cent. Sir E. Buxton asks, (question 680), "Considering as far as we are able to learn that under Sir Wm. Dolben's act," (under which the English slave trade was first regulated in 1788) "the mortality was 14 per cent., and that it is now only 5 per cent., do you imagine if the slave trade were allowed for a certain period, any great diminution in the mortality would take place?" Sir C. Hotham answers,—

"*I anxiously hope that the slave trade may never be allowed; if you were to remove all restrictions and take your squadron entirely away, small speculators would spring up and undersell those who are now in the market; the slave trade would be greatly increased in its horrors, and it would be impossible to calculate the calamities which would ensue; besides this, pirates would abound, and in my opinion it would be impossible for a legitimate trader to conduct his operations upon that coast.*" We beg to remind our readers, parenthetically, that this is the evidence the *Times* pretends to find so absolutely conclusive against the African squadron!

Mr. Gladstone tries his hand at getting this awkward opinion qualified, we shall see how successfully. "Q. 688.—You have said the withdrawal of the squadron would lead to a great extension of the trade, to a great increase of suffering, and to horrors unexampled; do you think that opinion to be quite consistent with the one you are understood to have expressed before; that in the main, the supply of slaves was actually regulated by the demand in Brazil, if that be so, would it not follow that the supply of slaves would still be regulated by the demand in Brazil after the squadron was withdrawn?" Answer: "I apprehend the slave trade is now regulated by men of considerable capital, and that *slaves are conveyed across with comparative ease and comfort*; if you remove the restriction men of a less amount of capital—small speculators, would embark in the trade, and then I think the trade would greatly increase in horrors." To the next suggestion that if the slave trade was left to itself the Brazilian government would regulate it, and prevent its horrors, the reply is, that "the government of Brazil is wholly powerless." To the next cast, whether if the present system were abandoned, the government would still be powerless on the subject, the answer seems to have at last satisfied the inquirer. "*Not equally powerless certainly, but still powerless.*"

Here we have the undoubted fact established before the committee, that the mortality even on board captured slave ships on all hands admitted to be greater than in those that escape, is only 9 per cent.

Sir Charles Hotham's statement of the mortality in captured vessels is no matter of opinion, it is plain matter of fact entirely within the personal knowledge of the witness : it utterly destroys the very foundation of the arguments and statements by which public opinion had been worked upon, "to leave the slave trade to itself." This evidence was given on the 25th of April 1849, and while it was still ringing in their ears, a majority of 8 to 5 of Mr. Hutt's Committee deliberately confirm and repeat these fabulous statistics of 1848! these facts are not easily to be matched, and we trust they may be equally without precedent or imitation in the annals of Parliament.

We anticipate a natural doubt of the correctness of this statement, and have taken the trouble to go through the returns of every year from 1839 to 1848, and we find that the average annual mortality from all causes between capture and emancipation during the whole of that time is just $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., but this easy mode of satisfying themselves of the truth, was not resorted to by the committee, and the assurance that 25 per cent. have perished on the middle passage since 1815, subsequent to as well as before 1839, stands in judgment on the fidelity and trustworthiness of the committee, though in their report it is established upon incontrovertible evidence that the squadron has caused a great diminution of suffering and mortality even compared with the regulated slave trade of Great Britain! It may be necessary to observe that all evidence and experience proves that the mortality in our hands after capture is greater than when vessels escape, though we doubt whether the difference is so great as Sir Charles Hotham estimates it at; it is, however, undoubtedly less than 9 per cent.; but whatever it may be below even 14 per cent., must be, even by the showing of the committee, the direct effect of the squadron.

The statements of the committee are so extravagant that even Dr. Cliffe dreads the effect of their exposure on *his* cause, and before the Lords he ungratefully turns round on Mr. Hutt and his committee, and tells us how these statistics were compiled. After asserting that formerly Brazilian vessels carried a surgeon and a priest! he is asked if he has any present average of deaths. We give his reply at length. "Yes: I mention it from some papers which I drew up. Mr. Bandinel copied it into *a lot of statistics* which he has made; but he copied it erroneously, or I did not describe it sufficiently clear for him to comprehend." The public will now see the whole history. These authentic statistics took their birth from Dr. Cliffe! We think we need add no more to complete a case of the most flagrant carelessness—to use the mildest word—against Mr. Hutt and his majority.

But utterly as we repudiate the general evidence of this interested witness, it is obviously of great value wherever it contains an admission adverse to his own case. He states that, counting from the first capture of the Negroes in the interior to the period at which they are considered seasoned in Brazil—viz., two months after landing, the whole mortality in the slave trade amounts to 30 or 33 per cent. This mortality, in former times, has been estimated at above three-fourths, and the lowest computation placed it at one-half. So we have here, from another source, additional proof that the squadron has caused a great *decrease* of suffering and mortality in the slave trade.

We think we may safely leave our case here, but we would yet recommend one more authority on this point to public notice, in the shape of an extract from a despatch from Mr. Kennedy, judge of the slave court of Havannah, dated 20th December, 1848, and received at the Foreign Office 26th January 1849, and, therefore, probably in the hands of Mr. Hutt. It is printed in the Appendix to the Lords' Report. This despatch, had it stood alone, should, we think, have induced the committee to pause for further information in support "*of their lot of statistics,*" before they were formally repeated and confirmed in 1849.

"Another over-statement seems to me to be made respecting the miseries of the passage. There are, no doubt, cases of shocking mortality and misery; as also we hear of such in emigrant vessels to America—for instance, the *Virginus*, from Liverpool, where 158 out of 467 passengers died on the voyage, and the *Naomi*, which sustained a loss of 110 out of 334, embarked at the same port. I do not believe that such mortality has occurred on board any slave ship to this port during the last twelve years that I have known it, from the western coast of Africa, and of six cargoes I have seen, a very large majority of each appeared to have suffered no inconvenience whatever from the voyage; in the *Columbia*, which arrived here in July last, though only a miserable boat of 29 tons, we have evidence that only five were lost out of 155 embarked; and in the case of the *Jesus Maria*, a vessel of about 35 tons, British measurement, condemned here, there were only 26 lost out of 278 put on board, and of these several had jumped overboard; yet these were the cases in which we might have expected the greatest loss of life, as having been the most crowded, though they might be accidentally favourable in the other extreme. It is the interest of the parties to bring them over as well as possible, and there is no doubt that this has its effect. *It is much more probable that overflowing cargoes and concomitant misery would be found if a free trade in slaves were permitted, when the vessels would be*

filled without any possible restraint, and when the life and comfort of the slave would be of less consequence than now, when a full cargo can seldom be obtained."

Before quitting this branch of the subject, there is one fertile source of error which requires notice. In 1839, a new scale for admeasuring the tonnage of ships came into force, which, in order to encourage the building of better models, gave a great advantage to the finer description of vessels, as the mode of calculation reduced their nominal size far below their real capacity of stowage; and the dues which are, for the most part levied on the registered tonnage, thenceforth fell much more lightly on sharp vessels. The Cowes yachts, for instance, were thus, by a stroke of the pen, cut down to less than two thirds their former tonnage, in some cases to less than one half. The *Alarm*, Mr. Weld's famous yacht, by the old scale, 193 tons, was now registered as 95 tons.

By the same process, slave ships, when captured, become nominally half the size they would have been called previously, the bounties on tonnage due to the captors being paid by the new scale, to the great disadvantage of the cruizers. In two cases, the *Reglano* and *Vanguardia*, condemned in 1840, the surveyor happened to furnish the court with their tonnage by both scales. By the new scale, the *Reglano*, which had been seized with 350 slaves on board, measured 48 tons,—an unheard-of number to such a tonnage, looking to the old scale; but by the old scale, the burden was 116 tons; thus showing exactly the former average of three slaves to a ton. So, what appears at first sight a new era—in which near twice as many slaves to a ton were carried as before—was, in point of fact, merely an arbitrary change in the mode of admeasurement, expressly intended to give an advantage to a certain class of merchant vessels. Thus, also, the *Vanguardia*, a very old vessel, which would have been in previous years, if captured, considered 194 tons burden, was condemned in 1840 as of only 81! These are the only two cases in which, as far as we know, the tonnage of slave vessels has been given according to both scales.

It is now time to consider the question of the comparative extent of slave trade, and how far Mr. Hutt, the *Times*, and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society are borne out in their assertions that the Squadron has, in this respect, entirely failed to produce any good effect; but it is necessary to observe here, that the Anti-Slavery Society grounds its arguments on Mr. Hutt's "*lot of statistics.*"

To do justice to the subject, we should calculate the amount the trade would have grown to but for the efforts of England;

and even if we admitted for a moment the assertion of our opponents that its amount is now exactly what it was formerly, we might ask with triumph, why has it not, in common with every other trade, more than doubled itself? Every increase of the slave population of Cuba and Brazil, far from tending to diminish the slave trade, must inevitably give a fresh impulse to it, since of the slave population only ten per cent. are females, and only three per cent. are carried in the slave ship, as we are assured even by Dr. Cliffe. We have the following facts in Dr. Thompson's evidence, a witness opposed to the Squadron. He states before Mr. Hutt's committee (vide Q. 5129-30-31-32): "The number of births compared to the number of women is also remarkably small." "Indeed, the number born in Brazil is extremely small; it is a very rare thing to see a woman with a child." But even the highest known ratio of births, with such a disparity between the sexes, would go but a little way to keep up numbers, since we learn from the concurrent testimony of all persons acquainted either with Cuba or Brazil, that under the awful atrocities of this hideous system, there is an annual destruction of five per cent. of the whole slave population. We learn, also, from Mr. Bandinel's work on Slave Trade, (p. 65,) that in former times "the English imported annually at least one-sixteenth part of the existing negroes (in the colonies) to keep up the stock;" thus proving that at all times the combined curse of slavery and slave trade must produce the same consequences.

We know further, that vast tracts of the finest virgin soil in the world lie waste in Brazil, and that the Government anxiously seeks for persons to accept these as a free gift. What are the possible present means of cultivation, apart from a commensurate increase of slave trade? A glut of the slave markets in such a country is a contradiction in terms, when used as an argument that the slave trade left alone would thus cure itself, for this is obviously impossible even while the land already occupied continues to be cultivated. Mr. Bandinel himself (whose authority appears to have had so much weight with Mr. Hutt's Committee as an opponent to the Squadron,) published his elaborate work, just referred to, in 1842, when his forty years' official experience was fresh in his recollection, and with every document at his elbow; and he there states the following facts, as entirely the result of the Squadron (vide pages 286 and 287 of "Bandinel on the Slave Trade.") After proving his facts by numbers, he sums up his statements as follows:—

"So that the number of slaves imported into Cuba in 1840 was only half the number imported in 1838, and only about one-third the number

imported before the treaty of 1835 came into operation;" and as regards Brazil, "In 1839 the importation of slaves had diminished upwards of one-third since the preceding year, and in 1840 the number imported was only rather more than one-fourth part of those imported in 1839, and not one-sixth of the number imported in 1838.

The diminution in the importation of slaves, does not, however, arise from a slackening in the demand for them, for in Porto Rico a newly imported negro used to sell for 200 dollars; the price now is 450 dollars. In Cuba such negroes sold in 1821 for 100 dollars; the price now varies from 425 dollars to 480 dollars. In Brazil a newly imported negro used to sell for 100 milreis; the price is now 400 milreis."

These high prices are still fully maintained, while in Africa the price of a slave is seldom so high as 5*l.*, or about 20 dollars. Remove the Squadron, and the price in Brazil and Cuba infallibly must fall to what it was in 1821,—one-fourth of what it now is. But does any reasonable man suppose that less money will be spent in the purchase of labour than at present? if not, then nothing can be much more certain than that for one slave now landed, four victims will be consigned to the terrible living death of the slave vessel, and the plantation. By all the horrors of such a fate to millions yet unborn, we implore attention to these considerations, but, though they are so important in their bearing on the question, we have proofs so distinct of the fallacy of the assertion we are combating (which is, indeed, overthrown by the very tables on which it professes to be founded), that we will boldly accept battle on the narrow and unfair field chosen by our opponents. We undertake to prove, even by those very tables, which we have given at p. 15, that the Squadron has actually effected a great diminution of slave trade from the period when it attained its present powers, and that what is wanting of perfect success arises from causes so palpable, and so easy of remedy, that instead of justifying discouragement, the discriminating consideration of those very causes gives the best assurance of eventual triumph, by surely guiding our efforts to the best course of action, and teaching us to avoid the errors which have as yet prevented complete success.

But, before we return to these Tables, there is one acknowledged and undeniable fact worthy to be hailed with rejoicing by all who do not exult in the belief that the efforts of their country in a cause so righteous have utterly and miserably failed. In spite of temptation as great to each and all of them as to Brazil, every South American State has abstained from this lucrative crime, entirely owing to the efforts and example of Great Britain, who, by her steady maintenance of the righteous principles of religion and morality, and by her urgent persuasions and remonstrances, has thus saved millions of victims, and rescued those

States themselves from degradation and depravity, and also from the terrible eventual retribution which must sooner or later await every nation that resorts to this sin as a means of preeocious and unnatural development.

If the Tables of the Committee were to be received at once without challenge they would refute the Report which is founded upon them, for they show from 1798, until first checked by the Squadron, a constant increase of the only slave trade that still exists, and from the moment the Squadron was enabled to act with effect, a diminution as marked.

The Tables inform us that in 1798, 15,000 slaves were imported into colonies of Spain, which then included several possessions since lost. In 1835, Spain possessed only Cuba and Porto Rico, into which 40,000 slaves were, according to these tables, imported. But in a note to his tables, not given by the Committee, Mr. Bandinel states that in 1798 only 6,000 slaves were imported into Cuba, so that the only existing Spanish slave trade in thirty-seven years, has multiplied itself by seven.

In 1798 we see it stated that 20,000 were imported into Portuguese colonies, consisting then of other possessions in the West besides Brazil. From 1835 to 1839 inclusive, the tables state that 65,000 per annum were imported into Brazil alone ! the process of increase having been gradual and progressive, except from 1830 to 1835, when the treaty with Great Britain declaring the trade piracy came into force, and for a time the slave dealers were supposed to be terrified from the prosecution of their crime. The increase, even according to the Tables, is much more than three-fold, or if we deduct 5,000 for the other Portuguese colonies, from the numbers in 1798, between four and five times as many were carried into Brazil in 1839 as there were forty years before, so that instead of the aggregate importation into Cuba and Brazil amounting to 21,000 as in 1798 (14,000 being devoted in that year to other Spanish and Portuguese colonies, and 38,000 to other countries), we have, in the year 1835, when both trades continued unchecked by the Squadron, an aggregate, by the Committee's own tables, of 105,000 !

The statements as regard Cuba, though we do not entirely concur in them, we do not intend to question ; but as regards the numbers said to be imported into Brazil in 1835, and the four following years we are compelled to notice a discrepance in the authority whose calculations the Committee have made their own. Mr. Bandinel, in the work we have already quoted, states (at p. 287) " the total number of slaves supposed to be imported into Brazil in 1838 amounted to 94,000." The whole context proves that this was considered no extraordinary number compared with

former years, indeed the statement of decreasing slave trade which we have extracted takes this as the basis of the calculation, and 56,000 in 1839 is the number specified as proving that in that year "the importation of slaves had diminished upwards of one-third since the preceding year." Referring to Mr. Bandinel's evidence before Mr. Hutt's Committee, (Q. 3313,) he says, "the greatest number imported (into Brazil) in one year was 87,000. This occurred in 1837." These statements, though somewhat conflicting, agree better with each other than with the Tables, and justify us in stating our own firm conviction that the book was right and the Tables wrong, and that in 1835-36-37-38, respectively, at least 90,000 slaves were landed in Brazil, which, with 56,000 in 1839, gives an average of above 83,000, instead of 65,000—a number still short of one-sixteenth of the slave population, a proportion shown to have been necessary to keep up numbers in the British slave colonies formerly. It would appear then, that instead of an increase from 21,000 to 105,000, we should read for the year 1835, before Brazilian and Cuban slave trade were affected by the cruizers, that they numbered 134,000 victims landed on their respective shores, while probably near 10,000 more perished on the voyage. It will be observed that our grand total does not very largely exceed the Tables, which give 135,000, as the number exported from Africa for each of the five years in question, but reduce the number landed, by the extravagant proportion of 25 per cent. mortality; and it approximates closely to Sir Fowell Buxton's more correct estimate of 150,000.

We must now, at the risk of some repetition, show the circumstances under which the Spanish and Brazilian slave trade, respectively, became subject to the effective interruption of our cruizers. In 1835, the new treaty with Spain enabled the Squadron, for the first time, to seize equipped slave-ships, hitherto secure until after slaves were on board. We have read, in the extract from Mr. Bandinel's work (p. 492), the effect of this treaty; but, after the first blow was struck, the Spanish slave trade was carried on in Portuguese ships, which were secure from capture on account of equipment, under the following clause of the treaty with Portugal:—"Ships, on board which no slaves shall be found intended for purposes of traffic, shall not be detained on any account or pretence whatever." Thus screened, the slave trade of Cuba was rapidly springing up, and would have soon gone on increasing at the same ratio as before, but for the measure of 1839, by which equipped Portuguese vessels were rendered liable to seizure and condemnation.

As regards Brazil, we have already shown that, until 1839, the whole importation of slaves was protected from the English

cruizers, also by the use of Portuguese vessels. Eighteen hundred miles of the Brazilian coast lie in south latitude, and an ample supply of negroes can be obtained from the African shores lying in the same latitude. This slave-trade was protected by this article of the treaty with Portugal:—"No Portuguese merchantman, or slave-ship, shall, on any pretence whatever, be detained, which shall be found anywhere near the land, or on the high seas, south of the Equator." By this treaty Portugal was bound to abandon all slave trade not directed to her colony, Brazil; this clause was framed to cover the supply of this her colony; but, though Brazil became independent in 1824, yet Portugal still insisted, for fifteen years, on the letter of her treaty, though now defeating its whole spirit and intention. It was not only a breach of faith, forming a just *casus belli*, but it was a gross fraud, in the ordinary sense; for England had made large payments in return for the pledges given by Portugal. At length, finding all protests vain, the British Government, in 1839, ordered the seizure of all Portuguese slave-ships wherever met with, and whether with slaves on board, or only equipped; and this order was soon followed by an Act of Parliament, authorising the Vice Admiralty Courts to try and condemn such vessels. The power of suppressing the slave trade was now, for the first time, obtained by Great Britain; for the first time the traffic to Brazil could be touched; and in all quarters the vessels of every state, still implicated in the slave trade (each having armed Great Britain with the requisite authority, and the flag of Portugal being no longer available), became subject to capture, when met with equipped for the crime.

Referring to the Tables we see from 40,000 per ann. in the five years before 1835, the Spanish Slave Trade, sheltered by Portugal, decreased only to 29,000 in the five years ending in 1839, whereas the aggregate of the next eight years only exceeds by one fourth, the amount of a single year previous to 1835; and for the last three years of the eight the average is only 1,517! We see here the legitimate influence of the change in 1839.

As regards Brazil we read in Mr. Bandinel's work of 1842, that in 1838, 94,000 slaves were imported; in 1839, 56,000; and 14,244 he considers an overstatement for 1840. He says, "only 7,122 were imported into Rio (de Janeiro); and the diminution at the outports was even still more marked; for at Para, during the last half year of 1840 not one slave was imported. So that taking for the outports the same importation as for the capital, *too much will probably be taken, and yet on this calculation only 14,244 were imported into Brazil during the year 1840.*" Turning to the Committee's Tables, supplied by Mr. Bandinel, we read with astonishment the statement that 30,000 slaves were landed in Brazil in 1840, and this without a syllable of explana-

tion ! We ask if it is possible not to prefer the statement we have quoted, but even adopting these obviously incorrect Tables, we have for the six years following the eventful 1839, an importation of 23,233 for each year against 65,000. This is no trifling reduction : but, applying the corrections we have proved to be so necessary for the five years ending in 1839, we have 83,000 instead of 65,000 ; and for the next six years, including 1845, but 20,600 ! It is also to be remarked that during these six years 378 slave ships were captured, which would otherwise have carried off 130,000 slaves, and that though the Committee declares, in a note to its report in 1848, that it was desirous to publish the whole number of captures since 1839 in one of its resolutions, yet when this report was received in 1849 and showed a total number of 594 captures from 1840 to 1848 inclusive, this desire expressed in 1848, *was not carried into effect in the Report of 1849, but the important fact was consigned to the obscurity of the appendix !*

It is true that an increase of imports to Brazil took place in 1846-7 and probably in 1848. But we are always dependent on the slave dealers themselves for accounts of the numbers, and though these may be generally trusted when there are no motives for concealing or exaggerating them, as soon as interest suggests deceit, we are utterly at fault ; witness the ridiculous notion shown in the tables that the alarm in 1830 was sufficient of itself to keep the imports down to 15,000 for five years—less than a fourth part of what would have been required only to maintain the numbers of the slave population. Do we suppose the cry of the last three or four years in this country did not reach those so strongly interested as the Brazilians ? How the heart of every slave dealer must have leaped for joy, to find the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society joining with the press to clamour against coercive measures, just as those measures were for the first time making havoc on their traffic ! Can we doubt that they instantly devoted themselves to exaggerate their success, and so play into the hands of their simple, unconscious dupes and interested accomplices, here ? We suggest these considerations to every thinking person ; for our own part, we are persuaded that the numbers latterly landed in Brazil have fallen far short of that which seems generally believed. But taking the Committee's Tables, it would seem that 52,600 were landed in Brazil in 1846, and 57,800 in 1847 : certainly a startling increase. But, can anything be more grossly unfair, than to take these two years and to sink the six preceding years ? or can we conceive a more flagrant breach of duty than for a Committee, appointed for such a purpose, failing to seek to discover whether any specific causes for a change so extraordinary existed, even by a

single question ; but equally without hesitation or inquiry, attributing it at once to the inherent impossibility of suppressing, or even materially reducing, slave trade by force ! The causes were repeatedly suggested to the Committee in answer to other questions ; but the subject was avoided. The causes are :—

1st. In 1845, for several months the cruizers abstained from capturing Brazilian slave ships, because the courts to adjudge them were broken up, the Government of Brazil having asserted the treaty to be at an end ; and the Act of Parliament treating this breach of faith in the same manner as that of Portugal in 1839, did not reach the coast for several months. This is established by the report of the Sierra Leone Commissioners for that year, in their annual despatch, dated Dec. 31, 1845 :—" With the exception of the *Adelaide*, detained on the 12th of Aug. and subsequently given up, no vessel furnished with Brazilian papers was taken by any of Her Majesty's cruizers, between the 23rd of July and the 22nd of October, in consequence of the expiration of the Convention of 1817, and the Act 8 and 9 Victoria, cap. 122, not having come into operation."

2nd. From Commodore Jones, (probably because he, for a time, was unable to capture these vessels,) leaving all the coast of the African Colonies of Portugal, five hundred miles in extent, to the sole charge of Portuguese cruizers. These causes combined to give a great impetus to the slave trade ; and when after the lapse of more than a twelvemonth the British cruizers were again stationed on this part of the coast, in a very few months a single vessel, the *Styx*, captured 26 slave ships !

3rd. The admission of slave-grown sugar in 1846, which, though not in itself able to maintain a successful and remunerative slave trade under ordinary circumstances, as proved in the case of Cuba, found a great impetus already given to the traffic of Brazil by the events of 1845, and as regards 1846, 1847, and 1848, a change in the mode of employing the Squadron in the highest degree favourable to slave trade.

4th. The change of system from preventing the shipment of slaves, and closely watching the Slave Factories, to a return to the old plan of desultory cruising in the offing, in vogue before the power to capture equipped vessels existed.

As this last is a matter of vital moment, and requiring more attention than can be devoted to it at present, we must content ourselves with merely stating the fact, deferring until our next number, its full investigation. But for the causes specified, we have not the slightest doubt that the reduction of the Brazilian trade would have been as striking, and as utterly beyond the reach of the denial even of the slave dealers themselves, as that of Cuba.

With respect to Cuba, we read in the tables of the Committee that in 1845, 1350 ; in 1846, 1700 ; in 1847, 1500 slaves were landed ; and from the return of Mr. Kennedy, (vide appendix to Lords Report, p. 94,) 1500 were also landed in 1848, which agrees with every other statement. He says, in his despatch, dated January 1st, 1849 : " It appears to me, therefore, that if the trade be, as I consider it, in a depressed state, the cause of this depression must be sought elsewhere, than in the measures of the" (Spanish or local) "Government." He states if the slave trade were again set free, the planters could then get slaves at one-third or one-fourth of the present prices, and would take 20,000 or 25,000 annually for some years, and he adds, " The high price then is and must be a check to the trade, and this high price is owing to the blockade on the coast."

The Gallinas has long been the great depot of Cuba slave trade. Destroyed in 1840, it was partially restored in 1843, owing to the confidence inspired by the unfortunate publication, and indistinct language of the Queen's advocate's opinion in 1842. Since 1844, in the expectation of the immediate withdrawal of the Squadron, raised by the press in this country, enormous establishments have been maintained at a dead loss. In February in the present year, those factories were again destroyed in fulfilment of the treaty of 1840, and had Mr. Hutt thought fit to inquire into the extent of property there embarked in the slave trade, he would have discovered ample proof of the efficacy of the "blockade," on the only part of the coast where it has been carried out. The value of the goods was enormous, but by some utterly unaccountable oversight, Sir Charles Hotham did not enforce the principal provision of the former treaty, Art. 4. "King Siacca binds himself in the most solemn manner, that no white man shall ever for the future settle in his country for the purpose of slave-dealing." Near sixty such persons were in the country, and held, by Sir Charles Hotham's reports, near 3,000 slaves, and not only were the slave-dealers left in the country, but their unfortunate victims were left to perish ! It appears by Sir C. Hotham's reply to the Lords' Committee (Q. 1893-94), that it was proposed he should exchange the goods in the factories for the slaves, which was properly declined ; but the whole country was at his feet, and it would have been easy to accomplish their deliverance, by the slightest show of determination to effect this grand object. It appears, however, that Sir Charles entertained an over-sensitive fear lest the rescue of these unhappy wretches from misery worse than death, might be attributed to a desire to obtain prize money. It is deeply to be lamented that he was not aware that, under no existing Act of Parliament, would any such claim have accrued

from the liberation of these 3,000 unfortunates; that such an award could only be given by a special grant from Parliament; and that, therefore, this imputation, which, under any circumstances, Sir Charles Hotham could well afford to treat with contempt, was, after all, a mere shadow. As a further proof of the efficacy of blockade, not one of those victims was carried off up to October of this year, when, we rejoice to state, that by the ability, zeal, and energy of Capt. Dunlop, of the "Alert," their delivery has been at last accomplished, the white slave-dealers expelled, and, at length, the treaty of 1840 has been fully carried into force. The same accounts report the total extinction of the slave trade from Cape Verde to the Bight of Benin, an extent of near 1,500 miles of coast.

With such establishments maintained for the Cuba slave trade, having at one time 3,000 slaves ready for export, while only 1,500 slaves have, for several years past, been landed in the twelvemonth in that island, there can be no question of the efficacy of the system which, as we said before, has nowhere else been steadily acted on. We ask, why do not these facts appear in the Committee's report?

We must once more return to the "*lot of statistics*," for the benefit of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, as well as for Mr. Hutt and his seven supporters. Referring to the returns from 1798 to 1805, we find the whole number imported stated at 73,000, of which 15,000 are given to Spanish, 20,000 to Portuguese colonies, and 38,000 to other countries; for 1805 to 1810 we have the same general return, but 5,000 are taken from "other countries" and added to Portuguese colonies. But Mr. Bandinel's book, quoting the best, and indeed the only, authorities—for no new information can have been obtained on the subject—says that, from 1795 to 1805, the amount of the whole importation "*was computed at rather less than 100,000!*"

Can the Committee be ignorant of the fact that, in 1807, both Great Britain and the United States abolished their respective slave trades; that both these ceased before 1809 expired, and that, at the lowest estimate, they together amounted to 40,000? We ask with astonishment, how the column headed "other countries," from 1798 to 1810, can be reconciled with the cessation of this enormous portion of the traffic? Neither does the average given from 1810 to 1815 solve the difficulty; as for this period, 20,000 are given as the number imported into "other countries."

If the Anti-Slavery Society pretends that the whole amount of Slave Trade in 1846 and 1847, equalled that which existed just *after* the English and American Slave Trade ceased in 1807, they might perhaps be not very far from the truth, but to support

the proposition that the squadron has failed, and always must fail, on such a foundation, is obviously as unfair as it is absurd. The year 1835 is obviously the period at which the comparison should be made, when one of the only two existing Slave Trades was first struck—or 1839, when both fell within the reach of the Squadron. The most unfair of all periods to take as the basis of such a calculation is obviously when British Slave Trade was suddenly swept away. We would, however, advise the Society to reconsider conclusions founded on the "*lot of statistics.*"

If we go back to an earlier date we learn from M'Culloch's Commercial Dictionary in 1846, in the article "Slaves and Slave Trade," "between 1700 and 1786, 610,000 Africans were imported into Jamaica only; to which, adding the imports into the other islands and continental colonies, and those who died on the passage, the number carried from Africa will appear immense. The importations by other nations, particularly the French and Portuguese, were also very great." To a single island 70,000 slaves imported annually for 86 years, and this on the undoubted authority of Bryan Edwards!

We are justified not only in taking 73,000 as a great understatement for the period from 1798 to 1805, but even in regarding the statement of "rather less than 100,000" as probably much below the mark, but this, adding 14 per cent. mortality would give 114,000. We only beg the Anti-Slavery Society to specify the period at which an equal amount of Slave Trade in past times proves our efforts in recent times to be fruitless. We defy them to deny that the Squadron has produced an immense decrease of Slave Trade since 1839, or that the diminished success since 1845, has not arisen from causes palpable, notorious, and capable of remedy.

The efficacy of the Squadron after 1839 we find established by a totally independent authority, M'Culloch, who, in the edition of his Commercial Dictionary, published in 1846, (in which he carries his accounts of Brazil down to the middle or end of 1843,) states "but the exports (of sugar) have not increased during the last few years; and now that labour is becoming scarcer and dearer in consequence of the increasing difficulties thrown in the way of the importation of slaves, it is doubtful whether it can be maintained." This can only mean the British Squadron, for no one pretends any other check whatever existed.

A short summary of our previous statements of the number of slaves landed on the continent and islands of America at various periods may be useful; the deaths on the voyage and the numbers captured by cruisers being omitted from the calculations.

It is admitted that from 1795 to 1805 there was very little variation in the amount of slave trade; at this time every state possessing American colonies practised and encouraged the traffic, excepting Denmark alone, who, highly to her honour, had abolished it in 1792. The first period, therefore, we select is 1798.

DATE.	SPAIN.		PORTUGAL.		FRANCE, HOLLAND, and other Countries.	ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES.	Total number of slaves im- ported in 1798.
	Cuba, 6,000	Other Colonies, 9,000	Brazil, 15,000.	Other Colonies, 5,000.			
1798	15,000		20,000		25,000	40,000	100,000

This may be taken as the amount of slave trade down to 1807, when England and the United States passed laws against the traffic, and entirely abandoned it before the end of 1809. The calculation as regards these countries is probably much below the truth, being less than any contemporaneous estimate.

France abolished the trade in 1815, but did not affix penalties sufficiently severe to give effect to this prohibition until 1827: it is now near twenty years since an instance has occurred of a French vessel engaged in the slave trade.

Holland abolished the trade in 1814, and by the treaty of 1823, subjecting equipped vessels to capture by the British squadron, the Dutch slave trade was totally put down.

The slave trade of these several nations, amounting in 1798 to 65,000 per annum, has, therefore, entirely ceased for many years. That directed by Spain and Portugal to other colonies besides Cuba and Brazil, is also at an end. The slave trade for several years has been carried on solely to Cuba and Brazil; but until the British squadron was enabled to interpose an effectual check, by capturing equipped slave vessels, the importations to those parts alone exceeded the whole slave trade of the world in 1798, and had themselves increased sixfold between those dates.

No. of slaves landed in Cuba 1798--(Note to tables sub- mitted to Commons' Com- mittee by Mr. Bandinel, Ditto landed in Brazil in 1798, taking the Com- mittee's tables, and de- ducting 5,000 from the Portuguese slave trade in that year for other colo- nies . . . , . . .)	6,000 .. 40,000	{	No. of slaves landed in Cuba before Equipment Treaty of 1835--(Com- mittee's Tables.)
15,000 ... 94,000	{	{	Number of slaves landed in Brazil in 1838, before 2nd & 3rd Vic., c. 73, came into force--(Vide Mr. Bandinel on slave trade, p. 287.)
Total number of slaves landed in Cuba and Bra- zil in 1798	21,000 .. 134,000	{	Total number of slaves landed in Cuba & Brazil in 1835 and 1838 respec- tively.

Checked in 1835, the slave trade of Cuba was rapidly recovering itself under the flag of Portugal; thus the Act of 1839 was almost as important with respect to Cuba as to Brazil. In the words of Mr. Bandinel, p. 225, "that Act has accomplished the purpose intended by it; for its effect has been to sweep the sea almost entirely of slave traders under the Portuguese flag." Under no other flag could they escape the equipment articles without incurring still more serious dangers, and a large proportion of the 594 slave vessels captured since 1839, have been condemned in the appropriate character of piratical vessels "not belonging to any state or nation."

For the six years immediately succeeding this important measure we witness the following remarkable decrease of the slave trade:—

Average number of slaves imported into Cuba in each year from 1840 to 1845, both inclusive	8,138	{ Mean of numbers given by the Committee's tables.
Ditto ditto into Brazil	20,600	{ Ditto, with correction, at p. 499, 500, (<i>Col. Mag. Dec.</i>) applied to the year 1840.
Total annual number of slaves landed in Cuba and Brazil for six years, after 1839	28,738	{ Do. by Committee's tables, corrected as above.
Do.	24,469	Do. by Foreign office returns.

The Committee's tables for 1846 and 1847 show almost the complete extinction of the slave trade of Cuba, but a large increase on that of Brazil, compared with the above.

Mean of the years 1846, 47,	CUBA. 1,600	...	BRAZIL. 55,200	Mean of years 1846, 47.
Average prior to 1835	40,000	...	65,000	{ Average for 5 years, ending with 1839.
The Committee's own tables show, as regards Cuba, since 1835, a reduction of	38,400 p. ann.		9,800	{ Reduction, by Committee's own tables, in slave trade of Brazil.
With this our estimate agrees.			38,800	Do. by our estimate.

By our calculation, therefore, the amount of slave trade even in 1846 and 1847 was reduced, compared with 1835 and 1838, by 77,200 in each year.

Even Mr. Hunt's own tables show, in the years 1846 and 1847, compared with the same periods, (no correction whatever being applied), a reduction of 48,200 in each year!

For the six previous years, as compared with the slave trade of Cuba in 1835 and that of Brazil in 1838, our calculations show a reduction amounting to no less than 105,262 in each year.

For the same periods (no correction being applied) the Committee's tables show a reduction of no less than 73,629 in each year.

We leave our readers to choose between these figures ; but we are at a loss to understand how those, even of Mr. Hutt uncorrected, support the conclusions either of his own majority, or of the Anti-Slavery Society—viz., that the only limit of slave trade is the demand for slaves ; that the slave trade is larger than it ever was, and rages wholly unchecked by the squadron. Both declare the Sugar Bill of 1846 to be an additional stimulant that never before existed ; how then, we ask, is it that Mr. Hutt's own statement shows a *reduction* in the total annual amount of slave trade, compared with the periods when the squadron could not act with effect, of more than 48,000 ? Or, going back to the years 1835 and 1838, is it utterly unworthy of notice that, subsequent to those periods, the same tables uncorrected show that an aggregate of 538,174 victims have been saved from the horrors of the slave trade by prevention ? We have, we think, proved the amount of success to have been even yet more considerable, and shall now show first how it was attained up to 1846 ; and then for the following years why, though still keeping down the traffic to less than one half its former amount, our efforts have been less effective as regards the Slave Trade of Brazil.

When the Act of 1839 came into force the officers in command of the several cruizers, having for the most part long experience of the inefficacy of the former system, immediately recognised the advantage arising from the power to capture equipped slave ships, and adopted the measures necessary to give effect to this power. They knew by experience that, cruising at a distance from the shore, a large proportion of vessels must always escape with slaves ; as the result, therefore, of their own observation, the old system of distant cruising was very generally abandoned, and the vessels, for the most part, were thenceforth employed close to the shore.

The squadron was at this time too small to effect complete suppression. and a part of it (there being no orders on the subject) still adhered to the old plan, and cruized out of sight of the land ; but this partial adoption of the system of preventing the embarkation of slaves was aided by the partial adoption of other measures which struck at the root of the evil—viz., the destruction of the slave factories.

In November 1840 the slave factories at Gallinas, which had long exported at least 12,000 slaves in each year to Cuba, were destroyed. Eight different establishments existed of great extent, employing 60 white men, and at these one thousand tons of goods, exclusively destined to purchase slaves, had been landed during the previous nine months, to the certain knowledge of the officers employed in watching this depot. These depots

were rooted out in consequence of the slave-dealers of Gallinas having habitually bought and sold British subjects from Sierra Leone as slaves for export, and this blow was struck in virtue of a treaty with the native chiefs, under which the slave factors were expelled, and prohibited from returning, the slaves were given up, amounting to near 900, and the factories were rased to the ground. These measures were entirely approved by the Government, as was expressly recorded by the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the Admiralty, and orders were sent out to act generally against the slave factories in the same manner.

Early in 1842, pursuant to these orders, Captain Matson was directed by the Commodore to destroy the factories of Ambriz and Cabenda, thus striking a blow as severe against the slave trade of Brazil as that of Cuba had received fifteen or eighteen months before. Had these measures been followed up, the force then on the coast would have been amply sufficient to put an end to the slave trade, *for without such depots it cannot be continued.*

Nothing can more remarkably show the amount of prejudice on this subject than the repeated statements (though ten times refuted) even of disinterested persons, as to the effect of the destruction of slave factories. These various reiterated assurances are entirely opposite to the fact. No loss of life has ever arisen amongst the crews of Her Majesty's ships thus employed, no bloodshed among the natives; the slave factories have neither been established at a distance inland, nor has the trade sprung up on new parts of the coast. We are still told it does harm rather than good, by driving away lawful commerce; though it has been proved, by the prolonged experience of a host of officers, that no shadow of lawful commerce had existed for a long course of years. It is true that Mr. Jackson, in his maiden speech, stated that he had himself known a cargo of produce shipped from Gallinas; but he forgot to add, or the reporter omitted, the essential fact—viz., *that it was 25 years before.*

As regards Ambriz and Cabenda, Captain Matson has recorded the delight with which the lawful traders witnessed the rooting out of their rivals, the truth being that in every part slave trade and innocent commerce are enemies and antagonists; in all its old haunts, wherever the former has not been banished by the squadron, it is preferred by the chiefs, and as long as there is a slave ship to supply, lawful trade is neglected and despised.

Still, however, we hear all these imaginary results of destroying the depots, and it has been even asserted that such measures are totally without any effect whatever on the slave trade itself. But the slightest consideration must satisfy any unprejudiced person of the tremendous actual losses they inflicted, to say

nothing of the prospects of enormous gains they destroyed! In proportion to the severity of the blow would be the anxiety to deny or conceal its effect. The terror it must have struck among the slave dealers of Cuba and Brazil, who had tens of thousands of capital similarly invested, can be no matter of doubt; but so powerfully did such motives operate, that the British Commissioners in Cuba and Brazil made no allusion to these proceedings, and appear not to have even known that they had taken place, until the intelligence had arrived from England! Dr. Cliffe himself, we might suppose, was entirely ignorant of these events, even when he tells the Sugar and Coffee Planting Committee of their effect on the slave trade of Brazil—vide answer to question 1490. “I once bought a little chap just like a dolly; he could not, from his teeth, have been more than six, perhaps not so much; he was too small to work: I gave 850 milreis for him.”

These facts may possibly suggest some doubts to the minds of those who have implicatedly trusted the slave dealers, when assured by them that the squadron is highly beneficial to their interests! We really expect soon to be told that the uprooting of slave factories, by the very losses inflicted, only encourages the inveterate spirit of gambling excited by the traffic, which (it has been asserted) would keep the hateful pursuit alive in the face of any penalties, and in spite of any losses!

Others, again, seem to suppose that a rise in the price of slaves, however great, would only give increased stimulus and enlarged profits to the slave dealer; but such an increase of price could arise only from proportionably aggravated losses and diminished numbers, and there must be plainly a limit to the price a Brazilian planter can give for a new slave. Unless we are to believe a similar insanity will induce him still to purchase slaves, though the price should far exceed the value of their labour, we must see that the slave trade was almost at an end when a boy of six years old cost 850 milreis!

But in August 1842, the fear of such sweeping measures was removed by the unfortunate publication of Lord Aberdeen's letter to the Admiralty, stating that the Queen's Advocate “could not take upon himself to advise that all the proceedings described as having taken place at Gallinas, New Cestos, and Seabar, are entirely justifiable;” that, under certain circumstances, (describing indeed the course actually pursued at Gallinas,) the Queen's Advocate was of opinion such measures would be lawful, but adding, “that if, in proceeding to destroy any factory, it should be found to contain merchandise, or other property, which there may be reason to suppose to belong to foreign traders, care should be taken not to include such property in the destruction

of the factories." This passage seemed to ensure perfect impunity to the Spanish and Brazilian slave dealers as "foreign traders," and was read in this sense alike by them, and by Her Majesty's officers.

The importance of this letter in the minds of the slave dealers, and their deep anxiety on the subject, may be conceived from the eagerness with which they seized upon it. A few days after its appearance in the Report of a Committee of the House of Commons, in August 1842, three actions were commenced against Captain Denman, in the names of the slave dealers of Gallinas and the Havana, with damages laid at above 300,000*l.*, including a barefaced claim for the loss of 4,000 slaves!

The Commissioners at Sierra Leone report, in Dec. 1842, that "at Gallinas the slave trade, which had been paralysed for a time by the sweeping destruction of the slave factories and barracoons, is stated to have *partially* revived." Thus this opinion had already begun to produce its effect in Dec. 1842, and in Dec. 1843 the Commissioners report, "the Gallinas slave trading establishments have all been restored, and are in active operation."

As regards the Southern coast, Captains Butterfield and Matson state, in their evidence, how completely the slave trade in that quarter was laid prostrate, and that the slave dealers were actually returning to Brazil in despair, when, thus re-assured, they established themselves again, and commenced their operations anew.

Captain Matson says, in answer to Q. 1330, (*Vide Commons' Report*), "*Before I left the coast, in the beginning of 1843, the vessels were beginning to come over full of goods, and the very same men that had left the coast of Africa the year before I met returning from Brazil—men I was very well acquainted with, and who had relinquished the hope of carrying on the slave trade.*"

In 1845 the slave dealers at Gallinas were again detected dealing in British subjects. The Spaniard, who had branded the flesh of one of these victims with his mark, (one of the plaintiffs at the time in the pending action,) set the British Commodore at defiance, told the natives he would "be protected in London," and escaped with perfect impunity, inasmuch as his goods, found in the building where this outrage had been committed, were "carefully removed to a place of safety," (with which he probably bought more British subjects,) while the materials of the buildings (belonging to the native chiefs, and worth perhaps 50 dollars) were carried to a distance and burnt! Thus were the slave dealers encouraged, and the hands of British officers tied by this opinion: he who runs may read its consequences in these facts.

But the stimulating effect of this document was for a time neutralised by the increase of the squadron, and by orders from home to adopt the system of in shore cruising, in order to prevent the embarkation of slaves; wherever this system has been carried out its success has been remarkable, and wholly beyond question. *On the parts of the coast from whence Cuba derives her slaves it has been steadily acted upon; on the parts from whence Brazil is supplied it has never been carried out since the year 1845.* Accordingly, in the year 1846 and 1847 we find the slave trade of Cuba but 1,600 in each year, taking the mean; while that of Brazil reached a mean amount of 55,200!

The system of preventing the shipment of slaves, and keeping the squadron in shore, instead of cruising in the offing, had been adopted on the recommendation of Captains Denman and Matson, as was stated in the House of Commons on more than one occasion by Sir Robert Peel in 1844; and, subsequently, the same system was urged by Captains Trotter, Adams, Butterfield, and Sprigg, as well as by the French officers examined before the Duc de Broglie and Dr. Lushington.

Having learned that, on some parts of the coast at least, the old plan of cruising at a distance from the land had been resumed, Captain Denman stated the fact before Lord George Bentinck's Committee, and attributed the alleged increase of slave trade to this change.

To this evidence Sir Charles Hotham alludes in the following despatch:—

Enclosure, in Elephant Bay, 17th August, 1848.

"SIR,—

1. "I request you will lay the accompanying letter from Commander Dixon, of Her Majesty's ship "Rapid," before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

2. "After the opinion delivered by Captain Denman before the sugar and coffee Committee, that proper principles are not pursued by this squadron in their endeavours to suppress the slave trade, I feel that I am not needlessly troubling their lordships in requesting you to lay before the Board the opinion of an officer who for some time commanded the Sierra Leone division.

3. "Should it be necessary to pursue this subject any further, I can, without difficulty, procure sufficient evidence to overturn remarks which appear to have been made without due reflection.

4. "In the mean time I may add, that Commander Dixon's informants are the slave dealers themselves, and the neighbouring chiefs, who to obtain their annual stipend, are deeply interested in the suppression of the slave trade.

"I have, &c.,

(Signed)

"CHARLES HOTHAM,

"Commodore and Commander in Chief.

"The Secretary of the Admiralty."

"Her Majesty's ship 'Rapid.'"

"1st June, 1848.

"SIR,—

"I have the honour to inform you that, to the best of my belief, no vessel has escaped with slaves from the Gallinas or Seabar from the 1st of November, 1847, to the 12th of May, 1848.

"I have, &c.,

(Signed)

"EDWARD DIXON,

"Commander, late Senior Officer,

"Sierra Leone Division."

"Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, K.C.B.,

"Commander in Chief."

But it appears that even in the northern division what the^c officers considered were "proper principles," were acted on, *not* by the Commodore's orders, and that on the South coast the very opposite course was pursued; but at present we must show the success of this system on the Northern coast and on the slave trade of Cuba.

In a despatch, dated December 5th 1848, (*vide* appendix to Commons Report 1849) Sir Charles Hotham says:—"The slave dealers at Gallinas, Seabar, and the North, formerly supplied the Havannah trade, during 1846 and 1847 few, if any, slaves were exported from those marts."

Sir C. Hotham states, in evidence before the lords, the following facts as to the means by which this result was attained; Q. 1883, "Does not the Gallinas trade almost exclusively go to Cuba?"—A. "I have always been informed so."—Q. 1884: "What mode of cruising was adopted by Commander Dixon, in charge of that station?"—A. "*He kept his vessel constantly cruising near the shore.*"

Q. "1885: *Was it entirely optional with him to do the one or the other, as he thought best?*"—A. "*Quite so.*"

Q. 1886: "Did the other divisional officers keep their ships cruising in shore?"—A. "I believe Commander Murray, who had been on that station eighteen months under my orders, has invariably done the same."

It is perfectly clear that, even on the Northern coast, the system, to carry out which the squadron had been increased, has been persevered in by mere accident; the officers who were in command having had a discretion left to them, which they ably turned to account; had Commander Murray not established this system, or had Commander Dixon not continued it, instead of 1,500 slaves per annum landed in Cuba, the result would have been an increase of slave trade, such as we have now to regret with respect to Brazil.

That the small amount of Cuba slave trade did not arise

from the cessation of demand, is proved by the fact that in 1843 all the slave factories were re-established by Cuba slave merchants, and were maintained at a vast expense down to February 1849, when they were destroyed by Sir Charles Hotham, as existing contrary to the Treaty of 1840. The great extent of these establishments, may be learned from Sir Charles Hotham's evidence (*vide* Lords' Report from Q. 1875 to Q. 1888). It is clear these factories were long maintained at a dead loss, in the hope of reaping a rich harvest when the withdrawal of the squadron took place, an event the slave dealers were taught by the English press to expect as certain and immediate.

Great however as was the success of this system on the North coast, Sir Charles Hotham still adhered to the opinion that the cruisers were most effective when stationed out of sight of land. He states that the other system is applicable only to the Northern coast; but Captains Matson, Adams, Butterfield, and Sprigg, who have the longest experience of the Southern coast, and who have actually in their own practice had means of testing the inefficiency of distant cruising, compared with operations in shore, have proved the reverse.

We have before stated that the African squadron was increased for the object of preventing the embarkation of slaves; but as regards Brazil, before this system could be fairly tried, viz.: towards the end of 1845, Brazilian slave vessels were allowed to pass unmolested, owing to the pretended lapse of the Treaty; and soon afterwards, when the Act supplying its place came into force, the English cruisers were withdrawn from several hundred miles of the African coast, comprising the Portuguese possessions, whence Brazil has always obtained more than half her slaves; and this district was left unguarded by British cruisers for upwards of twelve months.

In January, 1847, shortly after Sir C. Hotham assumed the command, the squadron was again replaced upon this coast, and the following extracts will show that a system was pursued diametrically opposite to the one, to fulfil which the squadron had been increased. Captain Lysaght states that he was cruising off Ambriz and Benguela about fourteen months, during which time he was ordered to cruise from 70 to 100 miles from the shore, *Vide* Lords' Report, Q. 4142. Captain Chads, who was one of the first officers stationed off Ambriz when the cruisers were replaced, and who captured twenty-six vessels in this quarter, does not state at what distance from the shore he was ordered to cruise; but he says (*Vide* Lords' Report, Q. 4057), "I had various orders from time to time; but whenever I was left to my own operations, which I frequently was, I

almost invariably cruized in shore; I found that to answer best. By cruizing in shore I did not take a single full vessel, but I captured a great many empty ones. *I considered that prevention was better than cure.*" (We recommend this to the attention of all those who have read Mr. Hutt's resolution of 1848, showing as a proof of failure, that only 4 per cent of the number of slaves landed across the Atlantic were captured, and who have not discovered in his appendix that 594 slave vessels, the great majority without slaves, were captured during the same time.)

Captain Sprigg, who had a long previous experience of this very coast, shows the "immense effect" produced by the small force employed in 1842, consisting of three vessels besides his own. These were commanded by officers of long African experience, Captains Matson, Butterfield, and Adams, to whose opinion we have already referred. In the Lords' Report, Answer 3656, Captain Sprigg describes the different measures pursued under Sir Charles Hotham's command. After showing the importance of being able to inspect the boats passing backwards and forwards along the coast, he says:—"Now in the former part of the time, it was the duty of the officers to acquire information, and they did acquire great information. When the subsequent orders came out of Commodore Hotham, to keep off the coast, they were so stringent, that although as an officer I had three years' experience on the coast at that time, the order tied me up as if I had none. It is also to be observed, that it was not only tying us up from obtaining information on shore, but it actually tied us up from communicating with the cruizers which were stationed next or near us. It was headed 'Confidential,' and by this means we were actually tied up from communicating so as to co-operate with officers who might come in sight of each other. 'Confidential.' Copy of sailing orders, by W. Edmonds, Esq., Commander of H.M.S. Heroine, and Senior officer of the Congo division. 'Mem. I am directed by Sir C. Hotham to inform the Commanders of the respective ships belonging to this division, that their sailing orders are to be considered by them strictly private and confidential;' so that in case of any senior officer asking me for this order, I was to tell him of this preamble, and withhold the order. '2. You will take up your station between the river Sette and Banda point, cruizing between those latitudes thirty miles off the land, until the 31st of August. Then cruize between the same latitudes sixty miles, till the 30th Sept.; then resume your former distance of thirty miles, and so alternately until you receive further directions, &c.'" Captain Sprigg adds: "This order continued in force for a period of eight or nine months. I met with three Commanders, and each officer said 'where are your

orders?' The answer was: 'mine are confidential.' &c. 'The consequence was, that instead of gaining information from each other, and assisting each other to intercept slavers, or planning any mutual efforts to bear upon a point, there could be no mutual aid or concert.'

Q. 3663. "Are the committee to understand that in your opinion the distance at which the cruisers were ordered to keep was fatal to the success of the blockade?" A. "I consider it decidedly so."

Sir Charles Hotham himself declares his opinion repeatedly in favour of distant cruising. Lords' Report, 2062. "Had you any means of ascertaining what their general plan of proceeding was in coming over from Brazil to the coast of Africa; when they near the coast what do they do?" A. "I believe that when they arrive at a certain distance, say 100 miles from their point, they send a boat on shore, communicate with the factors, and arrange the hour at which they will arrive; they arrive at the very hour, the wind being always at their command, and slip (their slaves). The greater part of our captures, as *I have been told by the dealers*, have been made during the time of their waiting off the coast. *They say* if they could arrange any system to prevent that, *they should not care a farthing for the blockade.*"

It is surprising that the British Commodore should thus trust to the slave dealers who had such an interest in deceiving him! This reads to us as the strongest proof in favour of the blockade system. The chart given in the Lords' Report which shows the spot where each capture was made by Sir C. Hotham's own squadron, sufficiently marks the reasons why the slave dealer should desire the Commodore to entertain this opinion. The chart, in fact, shows that of 164 captures, only 37 were made 50 miles and upwards from the coast, and that, notwithstanding these orders, upwards of 80 vessels were taken within 20 miles of the shore.

This fact established, the reader will be not a little surprised at the reply to the next question, 2063. "Had, therefore, in your opinion, vessels cruising 70 miles from the land, as good a chance of catching more before they got their slaves on board, as if they were inshore?" A. "They had a better."

Q. 2064. "And could they as well prevent shipment?" A. "Yes."

It becomes necessary now to remark that Sir C. Hotham's opinions are formed upon the reports of others rather than upon his own actual observation.—*Vide* questions and answers from 1721 to 1730, inclusive, Lord's Report.

But unsatisfactory as must be opinions collected from the

conflicting reports of twenty or thirty different sources, under even the most favourable circumstances, Sir Charles Hotham states at 1752, 3, and 4, that he consulted no one who happened to be serving under his orders at the time, excepting Captain Mansell, whom he relieved from the temporary command. After stating his opinion to be in favour of keeping the cruizers out of sight of land, in order to frustrate the movements of the slave dealers, and prevent the position of the cruizers being known, he gives the following answer to question 895 (Commons' Report):—"Such, therefore, being the position of your ships, it was utterly impossible for you, or any captain under your command, to ascertain the precise position of the places where the slave dealers had established their factories?" *A.* "*We could form some conjectures of their movements in the Bight of Benin, but on no other part of the coast.*" Therefore, had Sir C. Hotham been anxious to avail himself to the utmost of the experience of others, the information collected wherever his own views were carried into effect, could have been of small value. And this answers one of Sir Charles Hotham's objections to Captain Denman's memorandum as to the best mode of proceeding (*vide* p. 27, First Report of Mr. Hutt's Committee) viz., that the depots of slave trade are *not* known; how can they be known to the squadron when cruizing out of sight of land?

How little actual personal experience Sir Charles had obtained of the south coast, where his own views appear to have been most stringently enforced, appears in the following part of his evidence (*vide* Lords' Report).

Q. 1716. "To which of the slave stations on the south coast you have mentioned were you yourself able to give the most personal observation?" *A.* "I cannot say that I gave any one spot more personal observation than another; my duty did not consist in that: my duty consisted in superintending the whole station, instead of directing myself to any particular point; that task fell more on the shoulders of the captains under my orders, and to them I looked for the duty."

Q. 1717. "Then, in point of fact, it did not fall within your duty, as commanding the whole squadron, personally and actually, to observe, for any time, any of the principal slave posts yourself?"—*A.* "I cruized off them from time to time, when I had nothing else particularly to do. I did not confine my attention to any one post. *Still, if I did name a point, I should say Ambriz.*"

Q. 1718. "But you were not able, consistently with your other duties, to stay long enough before any one of the principal slave posts to be able, personally, and by your own actual presence, to satisfy yourself as to the carrying on of the slave trade?"—*A.* "In answer to that question, I may say I was long enough off Ambriz to be able to determine as to the trade being carried on to a very considerable extent. *Beyond that I can give the committee no particular information.*"

Q. 1719. "Do you happen to recollect how long you were able to stay actually off Ambriz in a posture of observation?"—A. "Cruizing off about a month upon one occasion."

Q. 1720. "At what distanee were you cruizing from the shore?"—A. "I was generally, I think, *forty or fifty miles from the shore.*"

Sir Charles Hotham (Lords' Report, Q. 1,690)—

Q. "Had you yourself any previous knowledge of Africa, before you undertook the command of that squadron on the African coast?"—A. "None whatever. I am almost ashamed to say that I had never even directed my attention to the subject; therefore, I came upon the coast as unprejudiced as any officer could be, except as far as I was actuated by the desire to do my duty, and please my employers."

It appears also by other parts of Sir Charles's evidence, that he had no instructions whatever as to the mode in which he was to employ his force, nor had he the advantage even of meeting the commodore he succeeded. Thus, a coast extending 3,000 miles, every part of which was equally unknown, the arrangement of a large squadron, and a duty of acknowledged difficulty, entirely new to him, were committed to Sir Charles Hotham, and with every thing to learn, he was thus left to grope his way in the dark towards the suppression of the slave trade. The various complicated duties of his command appear to have absorbed his attention, and he obviously had no means of forming opinions on his own actual observation. Sir Charles Hotham has attributed the former success of the squadron to the slave trade south of the line having been then "*in its infancy*;" but would it not be more just to say that the suppression of the slave trade was in its infancy when an officer, however talented, had such duties imposed upon him under such conditions? That England should succeed in the struggle while she thus conducts it, is simply impossible. Each new commodore is much in the same position as if he were the first officer ever employed on this service; and so long as officers are thus sent out, without either previous experience or *specific instructions*, the country is perpetually commencing the struggle *de novo* in the person of the new commodore, without a prospect of bringing it to a successful issue.

It has been absolutely necessary to show that the strong opinions expressed by Sir Charles Hotham are not founded on actual experience; had he been sent out *with orders to ascertain the places whence slaves were exported, and to devote his efforts to prevent the embarkation of slaves from them*, we have not a doubt of his success. As it was, no responsibility for the failure of this system can attach to those who recommended it. On the north coast, where (owing to the accidental circumstances detailed), it has been tried, it has perfectly succeeded. On the southern coast it has been entirely abandoned, and, although the

squadron still materially kept down the traffic, we have, in consequence, to regret a considerable increase in the slave trade of Brazil compared with the average of the six years following 1839.

Sir Charles Hotham has also specified some facts in support of his opinions. He estimates the coast on which the slave trade is actively pursued at 2,195 miles; but this is nearly twice the real extent of the slave trading coast, as proved by evidence before the Lords' Committee (*vide* question 2,128—4,460, evidence of Captains Matson and Denman), and on no other parts do the peculiar characteristics essential to success under present circumstances, exist. Sir Charles also states that lagoons and rivers run parallel with the sea, which "may be considered the railways of Africa; by them slaves are transported from point to point, and shipped, not at any fixed point, but according to the position of the cruiser," and that where these do not exist, the slaves are treated like post horses, and run from spot to spot; with his despatch of December 5th, 1848, stating these facts, he transmits a chart to establish them, printed in the appendix to Mr. Hutt's Committee, in which such a water communication close inside the beach is shown as extending all the way from Cape St. Paul to Loango, 1,300 miles—and again to the south a road is drawn as stretching to the south from Cabenda, between 400 and 500 miles; but the chart shows this road to run from 50 to 100 miles inland, and therefore it would not afford this supposed facility, even if it were an easy matter to drive about 400 or 500 ironed slaves like post horses. As regards the water communication, it is proved to have no existence for more than three-fourths of its supposed extent, viz., from the Quorra to Loango, by the concurrent testimony of several officers thoroughly acquainted with every part of this district. The only part where this lagoon really exists is along the Bight of Benin, where it can never be of the slightest use to the slave dealers in enabling them to ship a single slave, so long as the part of its shores alone available to the slave dealers (only 200 miles), is guarded by the constant presence of five active cruisers, ordered to keep close to the shore and prevent slave trade. It appears that latterly a discretion has been left to the commanding officer of that division, and Captain Hastings, of the "Cyclops" has ordered his vessels to keep always within six miles of the shore.

We have been most reluctant to enter into these errors of Sir Charles Hotham; but they are supported by his high reputation as an officer of acknowledged skill and ability, and should all his recommendations be adopted, they would involve, in our opinion, consequences so disastrous and deplorable, that we have no choice. Sir Charles Hotham's squadron was in a state of dis-

cipline that reflects high credit upon him; it is also to be admitted that it would have been desirable to have had for a time a greater number of vessels. He had, however, enough to watch all the principal slave depots, and had his squadron been generally thus employed he would have effectually checked the success of the slave dealers, and would have at least succeeded in keeping the slave trade of Brazil down to the average to which it was reduced during the six years after 1839, for most of the time, by a force scarcely half as large as his, and without steam vessels; as it was, appointed to the command under the disadvantages we have described, it was scarcely possible that any amount of talent, or of zeal could have taught him the best course of action, and destitute alike of previous knowledge and of specific instructions, no other result could be expected but failure. We have purposely abstained from referring to the plan Sir Charles Hotham suggested in his despatch of December 5th, as a substitute for the present measures, as the tenor of his evidence on this subject shows that it was made without sufficient consideration, especially, as in his various examinations Sir Charles Hotham declined to specify the period for which he would allow the trade of Brazil to continue, or to fill up any details of the scheme he sketched out.

The consideration of the question whether or not measures for the suppression of the slave trade shall be abandoned, would be obviously imperfect without a reference to the views of the British and foreign Anti-Slavery Society, which has long and loudly joined in the demand for the withdrawal of the squadron.

The British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society was first founded in 1839, when the old society, having carried the abolition of the slave trade, and of slavery in the colonies, had ceased to take any active part as a body, though it never was dissolved. This new society, early in its history, condemned the use of force *in toto*, as a means of suppressing the slave trade. But it is equally undeniable that these views were not adopted by the late Sir Fowell Buxton; and that Lord Brougham, Lord Denman, Bishop Wilberforce, Dr. Lushington, Sir Robert Inglis, Sir Thomas Acland, Sir Edward Buxton, Mr. Evans, and many other of the staunchest and most distinguished friends of the cause entirely repudiate them.

We regard several of the persons who form the Committee of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society with sincere respect; still we have great doubts how far any body of men, however well meaning, are justified in holding this title while advocating views which are unreservedly condemned by those public men, who are generally regarded as the representatives of anti-slavery opinions. When the country is told that the

Anti-Slavery Society urges the removal of the squadron, these are the names suggested to every mind, and the great majority, who have not followed up the subject with attention, believe this to be the authoritative dictum of all these eminent men, instead of the opinion of a few persons in general wholly unknown to the public.

It is to be deplored that persons honestly devoted to such a cause should find themselves in a state of discord and opposition, but the Anti-Slavery Society's opinions are so perverted, as to be most powerfully aiding the interests of the slave dealer, and tending towards an unlimited and perpetuated slave trade; anxiously then as we would deprecate divisions, here there appears to be no option: but by every motive which urges so powerfully those who have thought long and deeply on the subject, it becomes imperative to combat opinions so fraught with mischief.

Deeply as the subject roots itself in the hearts of those who have been long devoted to it, some warmth of language is scarcely to be avoided in dealing with nominal friends who have thus been led astray so far, as to support the machinations of the enemy; but we would anxiously deprecate all angry feeling, and attempt to bring back a part at least of those who now support the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, by means of friendly argument and remonstrance.

The society has, moreover, in common with a portion of the press, and with the public at large, been in some degree misled by Mr. Hutt's Committee; an authority on which it would naturally place great reliance, and which has doubtless powerfully contributed to confirm its opinions. The Anti-Slavery Reporter of last May, referring to Mr. Bright's attack on the accuracy of the society as to the alleged increase of slave trade says:—"The honourable gentleman would have acted more fairly had he attacked the *Select Committee on the slave trade on whose authority its statements were made*. But neither the adroitness, nor the eloquence of the honourable gentleman can alter the facts of the case; they are patent to the eyes of all but those who are *resolved not to see, or are so blinded by their theories that they will not see*."

Mr. Bright was referring to an elaborate statement of the society, strongly urging the withdrawal of the squadron, and this was founded on Mr. Hutt's tables, the utter fallacy of which we have already exposed. If the society still refuses to reconsider its position, it will become justly obnoxious to the charge its organ makes against others, "of being resolved not to see," of being "so blinded by theories that they will not see."

In the document entitled "The Slave Trade and its Remedy"

all Mr. Hutt's resolutions of 1848 are recapitulated. The Society does not appear aware that they were opposed by all the members of the Committee connected with the anti-slavery cause, and who might have been supposed of some influence with the Society; viz., Sir R. Inglis, Sir E. Buxton, and Col. Thompson. There, however, stands a summary of the fabulous statistics as the basis of the Society's as well as the Committee's conclusions. The alleged small proportion of Negroes captured is prominently urged—the 594 vessels captured since 1839 unnoticed. The slave trade in 1846 and 1847, instead of being merely an increase, as compared with the six years previous, is put forward as if it were unexampled in amount at any former time. The slightest hint of the great success of those six years is omitted, and so are the palpable causes for this partial increase. The Anti-Slavery Society, like the rest of the world, has been deceived by the report of Mr. Hutt's Committee, and cannot be blamed for having trusted to a document apparently so authentic.

It appears also that the Society had been powerfully influenced by the belief, that while the cruisers only aggravated every evil, the mortality among the crews was also appalling to humanity. But Sir Charles Hotham, whose statements of facts within his own knowledge are wholly beyond question, distinctly informs both Committees that the mortality during the two years of his command was only $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.—less than that in the fleet in the East or West Indies. He distinctly declares, that he considers the African station more healthy than the West Indies, and that vessels may be kept there two years, (the present term of service,) without any fear. (*Vide* Questions 732, 913, 914, Commons Report, 1849; Questions 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, Lords Report.) This change has arisen from the power of seizing equipped vessels, by which the slave trade has been driven from the rivers to the open coast, which is perfectly healthy; and the good discipline in which Sir Charles Hotham kept his squadron undoubtedly contributed to this result.

We think we have sufficiently proved here, and in former parts of these papers, how fallacious the grounds are on which the Anti-Slavery Society has been induced to demand the withdrawal of the squadron. It is time now to consider the remedy it proposes. The fundamental principle is this: "So long as slavery exists, slave trade will continue; and therefore the only way of putting down slave trade is to put down slavery itself."

There can be no doubt that if slavery was at an end, slave trade would cease; but that slavery may continue when the slave trade has ceased, is proved by the case of our own West India colonies from 1807 until 1834, and by the slave states of America, where slavery still continues, though the slave trade became

illegal also in 1807. We therefore deny the correctness of this dogma of the Society; but, even if it were admitted as true, we should entirely differ as to its practical application. It would be far more true to say, "Ignorance is the parent of crime," or, "Crime is incompatible with true Christianity." So far we agree, and join in urging the necessity of spreading Religion and Education; but we should be mad to dismiss the police, throw open the gaols, and trust our property and all we hold dear to the anticipated future effects of these influences. Where our own interests are concerned, there is no danger of running into such wild excesses in the practical application of even the most undoubted truths. But the unhappy Negro is the victim of the theories of his self-styled friends: he can enter no protest; and as the consequences will be remote from our own hearths, we shall probably endure them (vicariously) with infinite equanimity. There is an old proverb, "It is easy to bear the misfortunes of our friends."

As for this dogma of the Society, we answer, the slavery of foreign countries in general, we cannot assail; we deplore it; we may in our hearts condemn it as a sin—as an evil fraught with dangers to those countries which countenance it—but it is beyond our control.

On the other hand, the slave trade is already condemned by every state, though two countries yet countenance it. These are pledged to England to put it down. They have supplied England with the right, and she possesses the power, requisite. We know that slavery may and does exist where the slave trade has ceased, but we know moreover that it is this hideous traffic that gives the last bitterness to human existence, in this, its most wretched condition. When the slave trade is put down, the first step is made towards eventual freedom, and from that moment the condition of the slave improves, and ever must improve. The condition of a slave in our own colonies, and now in the United States of America, was and is, beyond all comparison, more tolerable than that of his wretched brethren in a Cuba plantation or in a Brazilian mine, where, urged by the perpetual lash, the largest amount of labour in the shortest possible time is the maxim, and the labourers are thus worked off to be replaced by fresh imports; in other words, by fresh outrages and horrors on the African continent, where, after all, the supreme misery of this scourge of mankind is inflicted. We urge these considerations as no palliation of slavery. We believe it to be a violation of every principle, by which we ourselves claim to be free—a blow aimed at the very foundation of human society; for what title to any mere external possession can hold good if the natural right of freedom is denied? The wretched pre-

tence, that slavery is sanctioned by Scripture, is the very climax of blasphemy and hypocrisy.

Still, we ask, where is our right, where is our power, to oblige other nations to set their slaves free? If we have not the power, the right will avail us little; but slavery in general being utterly unassailable by us (to say nothing of the obvious mis-statement of fact involved in their proposition), we more than doubt the wisdom of putting forth such an axiom as the fundamental doctrine, governing the efforts of this Society.

At present the application is made to the slavery of Cuba and Brazil, on the ground that all the slaves landed in the one since 1820, in the other since 1830, have been introduced in violation of the treaties with Great Britain, which would probably include at least three-fourths of the slaves in those countries. As regards Cuba, possibly it would be within the power of the mother country to enforce the enfranchisement of the slaves, and when enfranchised, to protect the white population; but Cuba now sends a large revenue to Spain, which in such an event would cease. If, then, England made this demand in such terms as the case would require, Cuba would throw itself into the arms of the United States, and Spain would be glad to relinquish it to the Republic, and rejoice in at once baffling England, and shaking off a dependency about to be converted into a burden instead of a support; the only result would be a breach with the United States.

But in Brazil the Government is utterly powerless, therefore no dependence could be placed on its assurances; and even if it really wished to fulfil its pledges, no result could follow. The terms of the existing treaty are as strong as words can be, but they are mere words, and must remain so, since the great mass of the people are interested in the slave trade. The power, however, it imparts to England is all-sufficient, if it were carried out on the shores of Africa with energy, consistency and resolution. But suppose this demand to emancipate three-fourths of the slave population were made, the answer would be, that if agreed to, the white people would be placed in the utmost jeopardy, and the country would pass out of cultivation. There is no mother country or other external force to maintain order, and to set free a population recently landed from the shores of Africa, would be to renew the horrors and calamities of St. Domingo. The cessation of the African slave trade for some years is an indispensable preliminary to emancipation; and much as we abhor slavery, we should deplore such an event, as involving terrible sufferings and excesses at the moment, and as holding forth no promise of future improvement. For these reasons every white man in Brazil is bound by every motive of interest, and even by

the principle of self-preservation itself, to resist to the last a measure so fatal to him and all connected with him; and the Government would be manifestly powerless to enforce it.

We believe nothing but the conquest of the country could effect this object; but how does the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society propose to compass it? The remedy proposed by the society, the "Reporter" tells us, after one of its tirades against the squadron, "*is simple in its character;*" "*direct in its operation;*" it is also "*eminently practical in its character;*" and "*only needs to be supported by the weight of public opinion to be successful in its results.*" The *Reporter* then launches forth some energetic denunciations about Brazil and Spain "*trampling under foot the most solemn treaties,*" "*mocking the English Government,*" "*treating with dishonour the people of this country,*" and after talking about "*pressing home upon Brazil and Cuba with vigour,*" &c., "*the plan suggested by the Anti-Slavery Committee*" adds—"We do not ask even to succour oppressed humanity, or to ensure the fulfilment of treaties, that the Government should send armed vessels to Rio de Janeiro or Havana, and at the cannon's mouth demand the liberation of the slaves, and reparation for the indignities inflicted on our country; but we do ask that if the just rights of Great Britain are not conceded, and the African made free, that measures be taken to exclude the produce of those countries from the British markets, until such time as they consent to do justice and honourably fulfil their engagements." This is truly "*roaring like any sucking dove*"—"a most lame and impotent conclusion." But we forget the *Reporter* has told us it is "*eminently practical,*" and "*ONLY*" requires to be supported by public opinion to be effective! The suggestion of excluding all slave grown produce from our markets—is it truly extremely practical?—then we have not read the signs of the times aright. Yet we must admit the extreme simplicity of the *Reporter*, if not of his plan; but whether this proposition is the more practical, or the expectation that when it is carried into effect, Brazil will abolish slavery, is matter of doubt. It may be otherwise put thus—exclusion from our markets will press so severely on the Brazilians, that they *will destroy all future means of production to regain them!* We have, however, some reason to think, from experience of the past, that slavery and slave trade would still exist and continue, even if our markets were closed both to Brazil and Cuba, for down to the year 1846, when that deplorable measure was passed, they were hermetically sealed to those countries; yet, until the squadron could oppose an effectual check, the slave trade of Brazil grew from 15,000 to 94,000; that of Cuba from 6,000 to 40,000, in the year! Do these facts tempt us to join the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in demanding

the removal of the squadron, or encourage us to credit the assurance that to prohibit slave grown produce, would be to put down slavery and slave trade for ever? Is it possible that grave and thinking men, anxious to do right, can have had the simplicity to regard these measures as "eminently practical," and to sacrifice the perfectly efficacious mode of action at our command, for one so utterly unattainable, but which, if attained, would be absolutely fruitless of the effects anticipated. No one can doubt that such expectations can be entertained by those alone who are so "blinded by their theories that they will not see."

It has ever been an object of great moment with those who have calmly considered the question, that after the great measure of emancipation, the West Indian colonies should yet prosper and remain in cultivation; and especially with respect to this "eminently practical" remedy of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, it requires little consideration to convince us how important it is that the enfranchisement of the slave and the ruin of the planter should not be proved practically to be synonymous terms. It was essential that our colonies should hold out an example to the slave-holding world, tempting them to the same great tribute to justice through their interest, or at least not scaring them from its contemplation by a spectacle of ruin and misery. Moreover every generous mind (the battle once won) would regard with sorrow the evils which may have fallen on those who were placed by circumstances in the adverse ranks, and on whom, though the country at large was responsible, the brunt of the punishment fell. It was essential, we say, to raise up the stricken colonies, but unhappily the bitterness of the strife has outlived the actual conflict, and now the interests of the West India body and of the Negro race have become identical, both appear to suffer under the old law "*odisse quem læseris.*"

How can we suppose Brazil will voluntarily set free her slaves with our West Indian colonies prostrate and ruined? Referring however to a memorial, addressed by this Society to Lord John Russell, in 1846, it seems "That the committee earnestly trust Her Majesty's Government will recall the cruizers from the coast of Africa; and the committee would urgently recommend, that the funds which will be saved thereby, may be applied to the development of the resources—*of British India!*" as the only part of the world able to compete with slave labour. If the squadron should be withdrawn, this recommendation will be proved to be just as "eminently practical" as the rest of the views of this society, but the proposal equally violates justice to the West Indies, and sound policy as regards the object of giving freedom to the slaves of Brazil and Cuba. The very idea of competition on the part of our colonies is thus repudiated:

those colonies being however obviously in an infinitely better condition than Brazil could be if her slaves were suddenly set free. A third rival is thus to be stimulated to the utmost to swallow up the other two, for a successful competition with the slavery of Brazil, would be manifest destruction to her after her slaves are emancipated.

The only favourable symptom we can discover through the columns of the *Reporter* is the fact it has itself admitted, and the uneasiness it betrays at finding itself actually fighting side by side with the slave dealers. Having made the disagreeable discovery that they are all of one mind as regards the squadron, the *Reporter* of last September says :—

“ In uniting with others in the belief the cruizers should be withdrawn, we distinctly disavow the objects and motives which seem to influence them. Many of them, we fear, care little whether the slave trade flourish or decay; nay, some of them we know advocate the renewal of slave trade by this country, in order that their commercial schemes and agricultural speculations might be advantaged thereby. We regret that by the force of circumstances we should be found in such company, or appear to give the slightest countenance to their sordid and inhuman projects. We repudiate their doctrines and their practices in toto. They would withdraw the squadron, and find no substitute for it. We would withdraw it, and find an efficient one.”

We doubt how far this disclaimer will absolve the society from the awful responsibility it is rushing upon with such obstinacy. So eager are its efforts, that a list appears in several *Reporters* showing forty or fifty country towns in which its emissaries have been employed in disseminating these fatal theories. Again, in the same article, the *Reporter* says :—

“ We ask our friends to discriminate; to look at the subject in the light of facts; and not to condemn us because men of questionable character choose to place themselves in our company. There are some who call themselves free traders, that advocate the withdrawal of the squadron, because it interferes, say they, with the liberty of commerce. They overlook the moralities of the case. We are not of that class. There are merchants and manufacturers who demand the suppression of the squadron because it interferes with their commercial operations in Rio and Havana; but we are not of that class. There are West Indians who ask for the withdrawal of the squadron in order that the money saved thereby may be devoted to African emigration; but we are not of that class. Neither are we of the parties represented by the *Times* and the *Daily News*.”

The allusion to the slave dealers of Cuba and Brazil, masters, mates, merchants, and super-cargoes, is rather faint and indistinct; but there is no mincing the matter. These and the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society are all in the same boat, and a strangely compounded crew they appear. Mr Scoble takes the helm, and we look on with consternation, trust.

ing that they may be upset before their slave-trading enterprise be consummated; but right glad shall we be to help our misguided friends to reach land again, trusting we shall find them somewhat sobered by experience.

But while the oldest and most devoted friends of the anti-slavery cause have watched the proceedings of this Society with grief and alarm, the *Times* has been loud in praise of its proceedings, though, throughout, treating all notion of suppressing slavery or slave-trade as utter humbug. On the 30th of November last, it stated that in consequence of the statements of the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society, the French Government had given notice to Great Britain of its intention to withdraw from the treaty of 1845; and next day appeared a flaming article, which did for once shed some new light on its readers. Hitherto we thought that pure harm in all respects was the only effect produced by the squadron; but on December 1st, the *Times* says:—"We confess we are inclined to hope that *if the slave trade were not checked by our cruizers, THE EXCESS OF THE EVIL* would rapidly work its own cure!" Thus we learn two new things in the teaching of the *Times*—first, that the squadron does check the slave trade; secondly, that if withdrawn, the evil would grow up to a great excess.

The constant reader who has hitherto placed implicit faith in the *Times* must have been rather staggered; but still, in spite of this admission, the *Times* confesses to a *hope* that this excess of the evil, (which it justly regards as certain,) *may* work its own cure; and farther on it says, "in five years." This is highly consolatory. *But why should it cure itself in five years, when, raging equally without limit or restriction, it failed to do so in two hundred years?* How can the slave trade cure itself, since it furnishes no inherent means for the maintenance of the number to which it swells the population? With the increase of such a population an increased number of victims is required to supply the annual waste of human life. We have already been told that in our own colonies, during unrestricted slave trade, an import amounting to one-sixteenth of the whole slave population was required in every year to keep up numbers.

But as for the pæans of the *Times*, on the supposed withdrawal of France from the treaty, and the anticipated excess of slave trade, they were as unfounded as the hope that such excess would, if it occurred, work its own cure. France had given no notice of the sort; and if she had, it was nothing to the purpose. No slave trade pollutes the flag of France; and until treated in its true character of piracy, France cannot interfere with the slave ships of Spain and Brazil, having engaged in no treaties for the purpose. If a cargo of slaves were found under the flag of France, the fact would be discovered by virtue of the right to visit to verify the flag by the papers, formally recognized as a

principle of maritime law in the treaty of 1845. The fraudulent assumption of the flag, and the forgery of the papers to baffle English cruizers, would be the necessary presumption, if such a case occurred. The vessel would be seized; and should it appear that she were *bonâ fide* French, she would be delivered over to the French authorities with a proper explanation: the master and crew, then, instead of getting *free* as Spaniards or Brazilians, would thus, by their own act and choice, be transferred to the galleys for life; such would be the *advantage* of assuming the flag of France.

With respect to the assistance the French squadron is able to afford, Sir Charles Hotham states, (*vide* Lords Report, 2074),—“They (the French) have not made a single capture during the period of my command; they were unable to interfere with any vessels except their own.” It would be no impediment to the suppression of the slave trade if the French further reduced their squadron. It is only surprising that they maintained twenty-six vessels without making the proposal sooner. We hope, however, soon to see France enabled to take an active part in the struggle, and have reason to believe that many of her officers would show equal zeal and judgment in the service.

We do not know whether the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society has really endeavoured to influence the French Government in this matter, but we earnestly trust before taking any farther steps, it will re-consider these doctrines; and if its efforts are approaching their consummation in the withdrawal of the squadron, that it will seriously inquire, each member for himself, whether he has not acted on mistaken premises? whether the advocacy of the proposed remedy has made the slightest progress? whether the prohibition of slave grown produce is probable? whether the money saved from the squadron will go to grow sugar in the East? whether, if it does, the ruin of the West Indies, and the successful competition of the East, would operate to tempt Brazil to reduce herself to the condition of Jamaica, by emancipating her slaves? and, lastly, whether the various conflicting interests, which have united with the Society to remove the squadron (but one and all having formed opposite conclusions as to the result, and having opposite ultimate objects in view), do not of themselves afford valid ground for doubting whether a safe course has been thus far pursued?

But if the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society obstinately continue thus to sacrifice the interests of humanity to an obstinate adherence to their theories, it will then become an imperative duty on all who are attached to the cause, and who have maintained sound opinions, to regard this Society as irreclaimable, to class them, in spite of their protest, with the various parties with whom they would repudiate fellowship; it will then become a matter of consideration what measures shall

be taken to neutralize the effect of efforts so perverted, and to repair the mischief ere it is too late.

Earnestly deploring and condemning the Sugar Act of 1846, we should rejoice if we could effect its total repeal; but this we believe to be hopeless. But might not a powerful union be effected on the basis of arresting the sugar duties at their present point in the sliding scale, until the slave trade is suppressed? This would be a moderate claim as regards the West Indies, and none but the most violent and reckless of the free trade party would be disposed to refuse so scanty a measure of justice to the unfortunate colonies.

This horrid traffic may be put down in a few months, from the day on which England resolves to undertake the work in earnest, and grapples with it on the shores of Africa; but "a consistent and uniform course of proceeding,"—"a well considered system, complete in its arrangements; and carried into effect with judgment and perseverance," are obviously indispensable: we have shown how little these essential conditions of success have been observed.

With regard to the destruction of slave factories, the squadron is again free to act. The Queen's advocate did not intend to draw any distinction between the goods of the slave dealers and the building containing them. The opinion was intended to apply to the goods of "*legal*" traders, but the word "*legal*" was omitted; and, owing to this unlucky error, *for eight years the slave traders have been encouraged, and the hands of the British Commanders tied.*

The only true wisdom—the only real economy—compels us to persevere in the task we have undertaken. No foreign enemy—no treason at home—could strike a blow more serious in its ultimate effects on the well-being of England, than she would inflict on herself, if, wilfully blind to the truth, she should yield to the clamour of the slave trade interest, swelled by infatuated theorists, and withdraw the squadron from the coast of Africa.

The truth is not to be disguised—with that measure England abandons the cause; she leaves Africa to her fate, and that fate is "the excess of the evil," the slave trade recognised, unlimited, and perpetual.

FINIS.